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Abstract 
 
Brexit is unequivocally expected to have economic repercussions and send ripples across 
Europe. The implications are expected to reflect on the performance of the various markets 
through transmission channels. Those transmission channels could be concluded in the 
fundamental macroeconomic indicators. The real estate investment is a substantial 
prominent market that is expected to be affected by the implications of Brexit and 
sensitively react to the possible transmission channels.  
 
The research investigates the European real estate companies’ reaction towards those 
transmission channels and their implications. It is hypothesized that companies with higher 
exposure to Brexit’s effects, and accordingly, channels of transmission, should exhibit a 
more pronounced reaction. The empirical examination employs an event study framework 
augmented by multivariate regression analysis, where significant Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
and Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARS) were used as leading indicators for real estate 
market reaction. The exposure is proxied by the magnitude of the company’s direct 
investment in the markets which are prone to the implications. Brexit was proxied by the 
Referendum event that took place on 23 of June 2016. Fifty-two listed real estate companies, 
from 9 different countries were sampled.  
 
The results suggest that exposure to the forecasted negative repercussions has a significant 
adverse impact on the real estate companies’ returns, while exposure to possible positive 
consequence has a significant positive and negative reaction. The findings, on the one hand, 
brace the Efficient Market Hypothesis. It displays the market’s ability to swiftly price-in 
expected negative and positive repercussions. On the other hand, it vividly demonstrates the 
impact of Brexit on the real estate market. 
 
Keywords  European real estate companies, Brexit, event study, macroeconomic effects, 
listed real estate, seemingly unrelated regression (SUR), Efficient Market hypothesis 
(EMH) 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1. Background 
 
In a historic referendum, the majority of the United Kingdom (UK) citizens set their 
country on the path to leave the European Union (EU), in an event known as Brexit. In 
2013, the Prime Minister of UK, David Cameron pledged an in/out referendum in case 
the Conservative Party win the general election. On 23 June 2016, the referendum was 
held putting forward the question “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of 
the European Union or leave the European Union?” with 71,8% participation rate and 
a marginal difference in results between remain and leave, 48,1% and 51,9% 
respectively, those who are in favor of leaving won. England voted for Brexit, by 53,4% 
to 46,6%, Wales as well voted for Brexit, with Leave gaining 52,5% of the votes and 
Remain 47,5%. Scotland and Northern Ireland both favored staying in the EU. Scotland 
favored Remain by 62% to 38%, while 55,8% in Northern Ireland voted Remain and 
44.2% Leave. The result of the Referendum was proceeded by many related events, 
news, announcements, and actions to move forward with the leaving decision. One of 
these prominent events is triggering Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. On 29 March 2017, 
Article 50, that gives any EU member state the right to unilaterally leave the European 
Union (Weale, 2018), was invoked. The triggering of that Article means that UK has to 
start withdrawal negotiations for two years, after which, it should cease to be an EU 
member (Sampson, 2017), and enter a transitional period that lasts until the 31 
December 2020.  
 
Since Article 50 triggering, UK government has been engaging in negotiations and 
debates both internally, with the parliament, and externally with the EU to set the 
features of its future ties with the EU and the rest of the world as a stand-alone State. 
The non-consensus between the different parties forced the UK to seek, few times, 
further extensions to Article 50 processes from the EU. On 10 April 2019 at the meeting 
of the European Council, the EU agreed to extend Article 50 until the 31 October 2019. 
Accordingly, up to the point of conducting this research, the future of Brexit, and how 
it is going to materialize is still unknown. For detailed chronological events, see Walker 
(2019). 
 
It could be fairly adjudged that Brexit in sum, is an unprecedented event. Similar events 
could be the departure of Algeria after gaining its independence from France in 1962, 
or Greenland after being autonomous Danish territory in 1985, see Patel (2018). 
However, the UK is the first large, powerful Member state with roots of relations 
between the other Member States to withdraw (Martill & Staiger, 2018). UK is the 
second large economy, third most populous, and a significant net contributor Member 
in the EU budget. EU as a bloc is the largest trading partner for the UK. In 2016, the 
year of the referendum, the EU accounted for nearly 45% of the UK’s exports and 55 
% of its imports. Accordingly, the departure will send ripples across the continent, 
having different economic entities and markets to react. 
 
Such market reaction would be sourced from expected consequences. Fama (1970) 
argued that a market reaction is not attributed to a mere event but to the foreseen 
implications of that event. Like any divorce, the envisaged departure of the UK from 
the EU is not expected to come cheap, and myriad consequences would be anticipated. 
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The prominent economic concern is for the United Kingdom to lose full access to the 
single market as a Member State Full Access to the single market means having the 
privilege of the four movement-freedoms; movement of goods, services, capital and 
labor, a privilege that is considered “central tenet of the European Union” (Van Reenen, 
2016). Such privileges strengthened the economic cooperation between the UK and the 
EU. It motivated trading channels, inward foreign investment, and labor market growth. 
The free capital movement /Passporting-right, per se, helped in making UK the center 
of the single market financial services (Wyman, 2016; Sampson, 2017), where investors 
used UK as a platform and gateway for accessing the EU financial market. Almost 
three-quarters of foreign investors cite access to the European market as a reason for 
their investment in the UK (HM-Treasury, 2016). The free movement of goods and 
services increased trade in goods by 48% and services by 84% (Felbermayr, et al., 
2018). Nearly 40% of the UK’s service export goes to EU (Lowe, 2018). Studies 
suggest that the UK’s GDP gained 10% from being a Member State, where foreign 
direct investment alone is claimed to increase GDP by 2,25% (Crafts, 2016). Moreover, 
the UK’s GDP has doubled since joining the Union in 1973 (OECD, 2016). Based on 
that, losing such a privilege would have its repercussions on economics performance. 
The magnitude of those repercussions heavily hinges on the shape of the UK-EU 
economic relation post-Brexit.  
 
Considering the ongoing debates on the possible nature of this relation, three prominent 
scenarios could be forecasted. 1) A “soft” Brexit, meaning that UK could secure a deal 
that allows for preserving access to the Single Market through Free Trade Agreement 
or the European Economic Area (EEA), following the Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein example. 2) A “hard” Brexit, where UK-EU economic relation will 
follow the World Trade Organization (WTO) terms, meaning that most-favored-nation 
tariffs will be imposed (Van Reenen, 2016). 3) Another option is an exclusive bilateral 
agreement between the UK and EU that might lead to a particular relation to consider 
the four decades of deep, entangled UK-EU relationship in the Single Market. Such a 
special relationship could resemble that of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA), following Switzerland or Customs union following Turkey, (see (Sampson, 
2017; Martill & Staiger, 2018). The adoption of any of those scenarios, however, will 
affect the economic performance of the UK. The extent of the effect would essentially 
evolve from an imposed limitation to access the Single Market or a complete block 
from such an advantage. Consequently, a rise in trading costs for both goods and 
services could materialize, demotivating trading volumes.  
 
Despite the challenges and the no-consensuses-state, some contemporaneous papers 
have been published to lend credence to the macroeconomic consequences. Those 
studies mainly put forward their findings in GDP terms relative to each of the 
anticipated scenarios (HM-Treasury, 2016; OECD, 2016; IMF, 2018). The most 
rigorous research has been carried out by (HM-Treasury, 2016). The study proposed 
that in the short term, the GDP would fall between –3,6% to – 6,0%. In principle, A fall 
in the GDP was attributed to the state of uncertainty that the UK economy will 
experience and the prolonged period it will take to reach alternative economic 
agreements with the EU and the rest of the countries. Such uncertainty would decrease 
investor confidence, demotivate spending, and increase the risk premia (OECD, 2016). 
On the long-term, the GDP was estimated to fall by –3,8% to –7,5% (HM-Treasury, 
2016) or by –2,7 % to –7,7 % (OECD, 2016). Those estimations are concluded by 
incorporating the potential effect from higher trade barriers, lower migration, and 
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reduced inward investments. Based on that, it could be clearly induced that a negative 
impact is expected on the macroeconomy regardless of the scenario; “soft” or “hard” 
Brexit, the only difference could be in the magnitude of the impact. 
 
As to most of the economic sectors, Brexit consequences are expected to descend to the 
real estate market through various transmission channels. On the short-term, the real 
estate market, especially the securitized one, is expected to react to the shortfalls of 
uncertainty. Uncertainty would increase the risk premium and accordingly pressure the 
real estate asset prices. Also, it could limit credit access, increasing the cost of debt and 
in turn, decrease the real estate prices. On the long-term, however, channels of 
transmission might be expanded. A fall in GDP, per se, could have various routes to hit 
the real estate market due to its close interdependence with almost all other 
macroeconomic factors. Several studies have been conducted to examine the 
correlation between the GDP and the real estate market performance (Case, et al., 2000; 
Edelstein, et al., 2011; Bełej & Cellmer, 2014; Delfim & Hoesli, 2016). The findings 
of those studies present a strong positive correlation between GDP and real estate 
returns on so many levels, local, regional, and international. A weak GDP performance 
is a sign of slow economic growth. Such a sign might demotivate foreign direct 
Investment (FDI) or even lead to a gradual withdrawal. That implication could 
unfavorably lead to drainage in liquidity channels, thus increasing the risk premium and 
consequently, the capital rate, forcing the real estate price to take a downturn 
(McAllister & Nanda, 2015; Oikarinen & Falkenbach, 2017).  
 
Interest rate and unemployment could, as well, exhibit a vivid channel of transmission. 
Real estate is a sizable investment. It relies heavily on credit channels and available 
gearing levels. An increase in interest rate could directly increase the risk-free rate and 
volatility, which will be directly priced in the asset value. It would lower the price by 
boosting the market capitalization rate, given that the market cap rate = risk-free rate + 
risk premium – growth rate (Oikarinen & Falkenbach, 2017). Thus, the interest rate is 
negatively linked to real estate returns (Ling & Naranjo, 1997; Bełej & Cellmer, 2014; 
Delfim & Hoesli, 2016). In the same context, a rise in the unemployment rate would 
turn to a lower income, fall in demand, and ultimately hinders rental growth. Hence, it 
would negatively affect the market profitability and growth. Accordingly, several 
studies found a correlation between the unemployment rate and property returns 
(Lorenz & Trück, 2008; Bełej & Cellmer, 2014). 
 
Currency fluctuation and Inflation could also go hand in hand as transmission channels. 
Inflation has almost tripled in the UK since the referendum, and the Sterling lost about 
12% of its value against the Euro (ONS, 2019). Currency deprecation would lead to 
inflation. A shock in inflation could lead to a diminished real growth rate or an increased 
interest rate (risk-free rate), which in turn decrease asset returns and eventually, 
property's value. Delfim & Hoesli (2016) examined both expected and unexpected 
inflation for the period between 2001 and 2014 for different investments vehicles. In 
their results, listed real estate showed an adverse reaction to the expected inflation yet 
positive one to the unexpected inflation contrasting the direct and non-listed real estate, 
which presented the opposite response. Pavlov et al. (2015) found a significant negative 
correlation between securitized real estate returns and currency fluctuations, similar to 
the findings by (Vassalou, 2000). 
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In sum, Brexit is expected to disturb the performance of the macroeconomic indicators, 
which in turn, will reflect on the real estate market performance, giving the role of the 
macroeconomic variables as real estate returns’ drivers. Accordingly,  it is of interest 
to investigate the real estate market response to Brexit effects and its possible 
implications on these macroeconomic indicators. 
 
1.2. Research Aim and Scope 
 
The research will be an initial attempt to understand the effect of Brexit on the real 
estate market. It aims to examine the sensitivity of real estate companies to the 
consequences of Brexit. Moreover, to test the ability of their performance (returns) to 
swiftly reflect the news and information that would impact the return drivers. 
 
The scope will cover European real estate companies, those that are incorporated in a 
European country. Those companies are mostly expected to experience the reaction and 
accordingly aid in examing the effect. The study will cover only the referendum event. 
The referendum event is the most prominent among the other Brexit events so far. More 
importantly, it is assumed that the referendum results were hard to expect. The evidence 
for that assumption is the nearly fifty-fifty voting result. Thus, the results are 
conjectured to shock the market and force it to react. That conjecture is crucial for the 
validity of the event study methodology employed in this research. 
 
1.3. Research Question and Hypothesis 
 
A reaction from the real estate companies is anticipated to be relative to news and 
information that would shed light on the shape of UK-EU relation post-Brexit and the 
possible repercussions of that relation. Additionally, considering that the UK market is 
the primary source of those transmission channels, the level of exposure to that market 
should be correlated to the magnitude of the reaction. Thus, the degree of exposure 
could constitute an asymmetry in the response between different companies.  
 
Research Question 
 
 Do Real Estate companies react asymmetrically to Brexit events? 
- Do Real Estate companies react to Brexit events? 
- Do Real Estate companies with higher exposure experience a more 
pronounced reaction? 
 
Research Hypothesis 
 
The research hypothesis is that real estate companies would react to possible Brexit 
consequences. Moreover, those with higher market exposure to, and more entangled 
economic ties with the markets that reflect those consequences would experience a 
more pronounced reaction. In order to examine that reaction, an event study framework 
will be employed.  
 
The event study has been widely used in the literature to test the market or even a single 
firm reaction to a specific relevant-event. The event study evolves from the Efficient 
Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Fama, et al., 1969; Fama, 1970). The EMH extends the 
random-walk hypothesis, which, in principle, claim that future performance of returns 
is independent of past performance. It implies that the market has “no memory” of the 
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past to predict the future as delineated by (Malkiel, 2003). Fama (1970) proposed that 
for a capital market to be efficient, it has to reflect all the available information 
comprehensively. His hypothesis suggested three forms of efficiency, “trichotomy as 
put by (Schwartz, 1970). First, “weak” form where market returns reflect historical 
information on prices. Second, “semi-strong” form where market returns reflect both 
the historical data (prices) and all available public information. Third, the “strong” 
form where the returns reflect the previous categories of information, in addition to, 
exclusive information known only by insiders, floor traders or privileged group of 
investors. Although both “weak” and “strong” form of market efficiencies are cardinal, 
the event study framework could be more concerned with the “semi-strong” form. It 
implies that market returns would be adjusted to the available public “new” 
information.  
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1.4. Research Contribution and Motivation 
 
Putting forward the unprecedented character of Brexit (Patel, 2018), no previous event 
studies covered such an event The research will contribute to the scarce literature on 
market reactions to such a unique event. It will add to the contemporaneous reviews on 
Brexit effects and to the literature that is concerned with the impacts of macroeconomic 
factors on real estate returns and the possible transmission channels. Moreover, it will 
pave the way for future studies that aim to investigate other Brexit events, testing for 
reversal, or more aggressive reactions.  
 
The research is mainly motivated by the substantial magnitude of investments that 
hangs on the value of the real estate assets, in addition to, the significant share of the 
European Union real estate market in contrast to all Europe. The Global real estate 
market reached over USD 30 trillion in 2019, coming from USD 27,5 trillion in 2016. 
The share of total Europe (Developed and Emerging) is approximately USD 8.9 trillion, 
of which over 90% belongs to the European Union Market (EPRA, 2019). 
 
1.5. Research Structure 
 
The following, Chapter 2 presents an exhaustive overview of the possible repercussion 
of Brexit on the macroeconomy of the UK and investigates the possible transmission 
channels between those repercussions and the real estate market performance. Then, 
Chapter 3 is a literature review on relevant events studies will be presented covering 
the theoretical framework for such studies. Chapter 4 describes the methodology, 
estimation procedures, and the built-equations employed in the research, in addition to 
the data retrieved and utilized. The results of the empirical study of the research will be 
exhibited in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 discuss those empirical findings and the 
conclusion in light of the outlined literature, in addition to, the evaluation of the study, 
and possible future research. 
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2 Brexit and Macroeconomic Repercussions 
 
It is of the essence to understand the possible repercussions of Brexit on the 
macroeconomics and the impact that could be cascaded down to the microeconomics 
of the real estate sector. The literature review will cover the expected implications of 
such an event on the macroeconomy. Then the possible transmission channel to the real 
estate sector by examining the sensitivity of the real estate sector to the macroeconomic 
indicators. Finally, it will review the literature on the methodology selected to 
investigate the reaction of the real estate companies to Brexit.  
 
The significance of Brexit descends from the expected implications on the 
macroeconomics that such an event could present. Those implications, in principle, are 
foregoing the EU Membership and the subsequent economic gains that the UK is 
bestowed by being a Member State. UK has a rooted economic tie with the EU since it 
joined in 1973. To put it in context,  the EU is the leading trading partner of the UK. In 
2016 the EU accounted for nearly 45% of UK exports and 55 % of its imports (ONS, 
2019), see table 1. Exports to EU countries account for about 12% of UK GDP, and 
since being a Member State, the UK GDP has doubled (OECD, 2016). The EU 
Membership led to an increase in trading cooperation, where it increased trade in goods 
by 48% and services by 84% (Felbermayr, et al., 2018). Although the UK’s balance of 
trade in goods is negative with the EU, the trade in services is often showing a surplus 
(ONS, 2019). UK has been the gateway access and the financial services platform for 
the rest of the EU Member States (Wyman, 2016; HM-Treasury, 2016; Sampson, 
2017). A substantial share of the foreign direct investment to the UK comes from the 
EU, over the past decade the inward FDI has been between 0.4 to 11 percent of UK’s 
GDP (IMF, 2018). It is estimated that being a member of the EU has increased FDI 
inflows in the UK by about 28% (Bruno, et al., 2016; Dhingra, et al., 2017). 
Additionally, the UK accounts for the largest share of FDI inflows into the EU (OECD, 
2016).  
 
Table 1 UK Imports and Exports in 2016 
 
UK trade with the EU   
Goods  142,705 
Services  104,034 
Exports  246,739 
Goods  237,067 
Services  76,966 
Imports  314,033 
UK trade with the rest of the World   
Exports  310,222 
Imports  273,815 
Source ONS, 2019   
 
The economic integration and prosperity that the UK witnessed after joining the EU 
were mainly attributed to its full access to the Single Market, a cornerstone upon which 
the European Union was established (Van Reenen, 2016). The Single Market grants the 
Member States free movement of goods, capital, and labor. In other words, it 
considerably alleviates the trading and investment costs and encourages economic 
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growth. From an economic perspective, exiting the EU means forgoing the privilege of 
full access to the Single Market and seeking other alternatives. Losing such a right could 
have a multitude of negative results. None of the debated-alternatives could fully 
compensate for those negative implications. Accordingly, Brexit could transcend to a 
shift in the UK’s economic landscape. It would heighten trading barriers, tighten capital 
movements, and discourage economic immigrations.  
 
The repercussion of Brexit would transmit in several channels that have both time and 
extent dimensions. The extent of the consequence hinges on the type of economic 
agreement that could be concluded between EU-UK post-Brexit. Several scenarios 
could be anticipated, see table 2. The closest scenario to grant UK similar access to the 
Single Market is joining the European Economic Association (EEA). That scenario will 
obligate the UK to contribute to the EU budget and allow for free movement of labor. 
Those obligations particularly contradict with the principles upon which the leave 
campaign voted and won. The aggressive scenario would be building UK-EU relations 
on the World Trade Organization (WTO) terms, which means the most favored nation 
tariffs would be followed. Such a scenario would substantially increase the trading costs 
and completely block the UK from Single Market privileges. An intermediate scenario 
would be seeking a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). However, such agreements could 
take a decade to be concluded like the case of Canada (OECD, 2016). Accordingly, 
none of the scenarios would replicate the state of the UK being a Member State. 
 
Table 2 Possible UK-EU withdrawal agreements 
 
Agreement type Examples Features 
European 
Economic Union 
Iceland, 
Norway, and 
Liechtenstein 
 
 Contributions to the EU budget. 
 Free movement of goods, capital, 
services, and people.   
 Outside the EU Customs Union. 
 Very limited influence on 
regulation. 
European Free 
Trade Association 
(EFTA) 
 
Switzerland 
 
  Contributions to the EU budget. 
 Requires trade agreements with 
individual EU countries and across 
industry sectors.  
 No “passporting” rights for banks. 
 Outside the EU Customs Union. 
 Very limited influence on 
regulation. 
Customs union Turkey 
 
 Tariff-free access to most of the EU 
Single Market, except for financial 
services.  
 Adoption of EU external tariffs for 
non-EU trade. 
 Very limited influence on 
regulation. 
Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) 
 
Canada  Mostly tariff-free Single Market 
access, but compliance needed with 
EU standards and product 
regulations. 
 No full access for services and no 
automatic “passporting” rights for 
banks. 
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World Trade 
Organization - 
Most-Favored 
Nation (MFN) 
 Russia, Brazil  Trade with the EU subject to the 
EU’s common external tariff. 
 
Source: OECD compilation 
 
Several studies have been conducted by economic organizations to paint the expected 
outcomes based on the possible scenarios (OECD, 2016; HM-Treasury, 2016; IMF, 
2018), in addition to, number of academic researchers (Bruno, et al., 2016; Van Reenen, 
2016; Dhingra, et al., 2017; Sampson, 2017). All of those studies concluded that, in all 
scenarios, Brexit would reversely impact the UK’s GDP, only the magnitude of the 
impact will depend on the materialized scenario. The implications are primarily higher 
trading barriers, a reduction in foreign direct investments, and a demotivation for 
economic immigration and labor growth.  
 
There are short-term effects and long-term repercussions for Brexit. On the short-term, 
an analysis by HM treasury (2016) categorized three main effects. “Transition effect” 
results from the UK being less open to trade and investment. “Uncertainty effect” that 
emerges from the vagueness about the EU-UK economic relation post-Brexit and the 
wide-range of potential scenarios. “Financial conditions’ effect” the volatility that 
might associate the financial market due to weaker confidence. Such effects would 
increase the risk premium and subsequently cost of debt reflecting on asset pricing. It 
would trigger a cut in spending, employment, and the appetite to invest. Those effects 
will ultimately reflect on the UK macroeconomics. (HM-Treasury, 2016) employed a 
vector auto-regression (VAR) Equation to identify the impact of the increased 
uncertainty on the overall economic activity, see table 3. 
 
Table 3 Brexit Short-term Impacts 
 
Macroeconomic Indicator Effect  
GDP -3.6 to –6.0 
CPI Inflation +2.3 to +2.7 
Unemployment rate +1.6 to +2.4 
House prices -10% to –18% 
Sterling exchange rate -12% to -15% 
Source: HM Treasury, 2016 
 
On the long-term see table 4, the consequence will be more aggressive, but would 
substantially depend on the shape on the UK-EU relation post-Brexit. In general, losing 
access to the Single Market would lead to a higher trading cost. Trading costs are 
sourced from both tariffs barriers (Customs) and non-tariffs barriers (border control, 
rules-of-origin checks, and regulation on products standards). It will also lead to a 
tighter capital movement and immigration policy. Higher trading costs and tighter 
capital movements would reflect in a decrease in the foreign direct investment (OECD, 
2016). The access to the Single Market was a prominent reason for the UK’s 
attractiveness for FDI. Almost three-quarters of foreign investors cite access to the 
European market as a reason for their investment in the UK (HM-Treasury, 2016). The 
annual value of inward FDI has been between 0.4 to 11 percent of UK GDP over the 
past ten years, and a significant share of it comes from the EU (IMF, 2018). 
 
On the other hand, restricted immigration would lower labor force growth and could 
cause skilled brains drainage, hindering technical innovation. Economic immigration 
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accounts for one-half of the UK’s GDP growth since 2005 (OECD, 2016). All those 
channels are expected to ultimately have repercussions on the GDP, see table 4. None 
of the possible scenarios could completely block those repercussions. Different studies 
show a close estimation. The least estimated fall in the GDP is 2,6% (IMF, 2018), it is 
estimated using a standard multi-country and multi-sector computable general 
equilibrium model. That fall significantly outweighs the 0,35% gain when UK refrain 
from contributing to the EU budget after exiting the Union. 
 
Table 4 Brexit long-term repercussions 
 
Time 
span 
Scenario 
GDP 
(%) 
Transmission channels 
Risk 
premia 
Confidence Trade FDI Skills Immi-
gration 
Dereg-
ulation 
2020  -3.3 • • •   •  
 Optimistic -2.7   • • • • • 
2030 Central -5.1   • • • • • 
 Pessimistic -7.7   • • • •  
The change in GDP is relative to No-Brexit scenario 
Source OECD calculations 
 
In the same regard, (Portes & Forte, 2016) tackled the impact on GDP from the labor 
growth perspective. Their study focused on immigration reduction consequences. As 
the extent of Brexit is still vague, their study relied on the concept of reversal. The 
reversal means relying on the estimates of the direct impact of immigration-free-
movement and how Brexit could reverse that impact. Two scenarios where employed 
50%, and an extreme 100% reversal by the year 2020, in light of different Brexit 
scenarios.  The first scenario, the “central scenario,” as named by the authors, estimated 
the GDP to fall between 0,63% and 1,19%. While for the extreme scenario, it is 
expected to fall between 0,92% up to nearly 1,78%. The fall would be caused by a 
decrease in employment, labor force, productivity, and ultimately, GDP.  
 
On a more extended level, Bruno et al. (2016) investigated the effect of Brexit on the 
foreign direct investment (FDI) levels. In other words, how EU membership affects the 
inflows of FDI. Their study sourced bilateral FDI data on 34 OECD countries spanning 
28 years from 1985-2013 and deployed the structural gravity model. The results were 
robust and showed that EU membership on average increases FDI by 28%. It estimates 
a 22% reduction in the UK’s FDI had Brexit materialize. FDI is a significant contributor 
to national productivity and wage. It brings technological advantages and managerial 
best practices, and as mentioned before, a reduction in FDI could negatively influence 
the GDP.  
 
The results of the studies mentioned above manifest the UK as an unfavorable prospect 
for future investments after Brexit. Accordingly, based on a study carried by Bruegel, 
30% of the wholesale banking in Europe, with 10,000 banking position will relocate 
from London to the monetary union of Europe (Sapir, et al., 2017). The study suggests 
that Germany and France are prominent alternatives. Also, (Schelkle, 2018) proposed 
that if Brexit materializes, it is likely that investment institutions will re-allocate from 
the UK to a different EU center, such as Frankfurt or Paris to preserve the access to the 
Single Market. The choice of France and Germany in contrast to the UK comes from 
their active role in maintaining the unity of the remaining EU members after Brexit was 
initiated, see (Paterson, 2018) and (Drake, 2018). (Knight-Frank, 2018) investigated the 
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re-allocations and found that Ireland attracted the most significant number of re-
allocations with nearly 25% of the total re-allocation recorded by Knight-Frank,  
followed by Luxembourg, 20% then Germany and France by approximately 14,5% and 
12% respectively. 
 
Evidentially Brexit will have implications which will ultimately affect various markets 
in both short and long terms. The long-term consequences would result from a 
disruption in the macroeconomic performance while the short-term effects are 
attributed to forecasting and uncertainty. Consequently, market reaction is immanent to 
price-in those effects.  
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3 Transmission Channels 
 
It is hard to interpret the direct effect of Brexit on the real estate market as the event is 
not directly targeting that specific market. But it could be analyzed indirectly through 
possible transmission channels. The channels that would convey the effects to the real 
estate return drivers. As demonstrated, Brexit will have repercussion on the 
macroeconomic variables (Van Reenen, 2016; Dhingra, et al., 2017; Felbermayr, et al., 
2018). Those variables, per se, are expected to act as direct transmission channels. 
Several studies examined the effect of the macroeconomic variables on the real estate 
sector, where it has been concluded that those variables act as return drivers (e.g. (Case, 
et al., 2000; Bełej & Cellmer, 2014)). Alternatively, the effect of such transmission 
channels could be indirectly examined through their impact on the equity market and 
accordingly, the listed real estate sector. 
 
GDP is a cardinal macroeconomic indicator, and it is tightly interconnected to all other 
indicators. That could be clearly induced from the fact that all the studies on Brexit 
repercussion translated the implications of other indicators into GDP terms.  It is hard 
to link the GDP directly to the real estate market reaction; however, it could be, 
unequivocally, connected through a median indicator. For instance, a lower GDP could 
decrease the average income per capita and in turn pressure rents and prices. Or in a 
broader level, a pressured GDP would trigger an FDI withdrawal, reducing liquidity 
and prices. 
 
Case et al. (2000) studied the correlation between GDP and returns of different 
international real estate markets (direct investment). The data covered the period 1987-
1997 for 21 countries. The selected countries are diverse. They included European 
countries, Australia, the USA, and some Asian countries like Hong Kong, Malaysia, 
Japan, and Thailand. For the 11-year period under study, the results show significant 
co-movement between GDP and real estate returns. The study suggested that both 
national and global GDP explain the correlation between international real estate 
returns, with superiority to local GDP. On a regional level, (Delfim & Hoesli, 2016) 
compared the impact of GDP, among other macroeconomic variables, on the returns of 
European listed, non-listed and direct real estate investments, using yearly data for the 
period 2001 to 2014 and applying panel regression. The findings suggested a positive 
link between GDP growth and the performance of the real estate instruments under 
study. Also, it has been found that the listed real estate is as twice as sensitive in contrast 
to non-listed. Moreover, Edelstein et al. (2011) found a positive correlation between 
local GDP and excess real estate return for the period 2004-2006. Bełej & Cellmer 
(2014) added by putting forward that the reaction of the real estate prices to the GDP 
variable is simultaneous. Their study examined the correlation coefficient between 
lagged GDP for the period of 0, 6, 12, 18, 24, 30, and 36 months and the average real 
estate price.  They found that the more the span, the weaker coefficient, where the 
coefficient for the 0 months was 0.967 while for the 36 months the coefficient was 
0.833. Additionally, the GDP coefficient in their multivariate regression analysis was 
statistically significant at the 0,01% level, implying the importance of GDP as a driving 
force for real estate returns.   
 
Other studies showed a correlation between foreign investment variable and the real 
estate performance. The magnitude of foreign investment could impact the real estate 
market directly through increasing the market liquidity, reducing risk premium, and the 
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capital rate (Cap. rate.) in accordance. In the European context, (Oikarinen & 
Falkenbach, 2017) examined the determinants of Cap rate. The study deployed 
Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) and used semi-annual data for the period 
between 1990- 2015 for the Finnish market (CBD area). They found a statistically 
significant impact for the share of the foreign investment in the local transaction 
volumes. That impact takes a negative direction where a 10% increase in the foreign 
Investment share corresponds to a 30% decrease in the cap rate and accordingly, value 
appreciation. Worth mentioning that the cap rate is equivalent to the earings-price ratio 
for a stock (Oikarinen & Falkenbach, 2017). For the US market, (McAllister & Nanda, 
2015) studied the US Office markets across 38 metro areas for the period 2001-2013. 
The study modeled the Cap.-rate determinates and found the foreign investment a 
significant variable. The study concluded that a 100 basis points increase in the foreign 
investment leads to 8 basis point decrease in the Cap. Rate. In the same regard, Jiang et 
al. (1998) explained the role of foreign direct investment in the performance real estate 
market during a tight Monterey policy in China. The study suggests that cities which 
attract higher levels of foreign direct investments are able to sustain their real estate 
markets. 
 
Interest rates and unemployment are also proven to play a significant role in driving 
real estate prices and returns. On the one hand, the significance of the interest rate is 
stimulated from the nature of the real estate as a bulky investment; thus, it is a heavily 
geared asset (Falkenbach & Hoesli, 2017). An increase in the interest rate would raise 
the cost of debt and consequently pressure the prices and returns of the real estate. 
Listed, non-listed, and direct, real estate investment vehicles are driven by the 
performance of the underlying asset, at least on the long term (Hoesli & Oikarinen, 
2016). Hence, those vehicles sensitively react to a change in the interest rate. In the 
European context, Delfim & Hoesli (2016) proxied the interest rate by 10-year real 
interest rate growth and highlighted a negative reaction from all vehicles from an 
increase in the interest rate. Ling & Naranjo (1997) found a negative correlation 
between interest rate and real estate returns in the US, as well. On the other hand, the 
importance of the unemployment rate is sourced from its negative direct effect on the 
income level and the purchasing power. Those two factors will subsequently decrease 
the demand, pressuring the real estate prices down. Lorenz & Trück (2008) studied the 
effect of the unemployment rate, among others, on different commercial real estate 
types, including office, retail, residential, industrial. They found that the unemployment 
rate is a significant variable, in the multivariate regression model used over 1985-2004 
span.  Bełej & Cellmer (2014) found the same results for interest rate and 
unemployment rate. Furthermore, their study proposed that prices more sensitively 
react to the unemployment rate than to the interest rate. Based on their analysis, it took 
prices seven months to react to a change in the unemployment rate in contrast to 36 
months for the interest rate. 
 
Moving to inflaton, in the UK, inflation has almost tripled since the referendum. It 
spiked from 0,8% in June 2016 to 2,2 in November 2018 (ONS, 2019). Inflation could 
directly affect the real estate market through an increase in prices or slip through the 
cap rate. The cap rate is the ratio of the net operating income to market value. It is 
determined by the risk-free rate, where Cap rate = risk-free + risk premium – expected 
growth (Oikarinen & Falkenbach, 2017). A rise in inflation would, in turn, increase 
local interest and the risk-free rate. That increase would reflect on a higher cap rate and 
accordingly, lower prices. Such a loop has been tested in Delfim & Hoesli (2016) study, 
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mentioned earlier. They examined both expected and unexpected inflation for the 
period between 2001 and 2014. Listed real estate showed an adverse reaction to the 
expected inflation yet positive one to the unexpected inflation contrasting the direct and 
non-listed real estate, which presented the opposite response. Similar, implications 
could be exhibited from currency fluctuations or even long-term depreciation. Since the 
Referendum, the pound sterling has depreciated against the Euro by 12% (ONS, 2019). 
Currency deprecation could initially drag the values down. It would also increase 
inflation with its consequences. On an international level, Pavlov et al. (2015) found a 
significant positive correlation between securitized real estate returns and currency 
fluctuations. Similar to the findings by Vassalou (2000). For a literature review on the 
effect of currency risk on direct international real estate investment, see Sirmans & 
Worzala (2003).  
 
In parallel literature, the studies that used the equity market performance as a proxy for 
macroeconomic performance found significant results that put forward the ability of 
those variables in explaining the variation in real estate returns. Investigating the excess 
returns of the international listed real estate, retrieved from GPR for the period between 
1984 and 1999, for over 600 companies and 28 countries, Ling & Naranjo (2002) found 
that both orthogonalized country-specific and global equity performance show strong 
ability in explaining the excess return on international real estate. Their study employed 
a multi-factor model, not only on an aggregated index level but also on dis-aggregated 
firm-level. Bond et al. (2003) found the same results for the explanatory power of both 
global and country-specific factor explanatory power. There is also evidence that 
countries of the same region are influenced by the performance of each other. Eichholtz 
et al. (1988) found that in particular European countries’ real estate returns are 
positively and significantly correlated. The study investigated 12 European countries 
for the period between 1985-1995. Hamelink & Hoesli (2004) extended the multi-factor 
of the common and country-specific variable to include the size, value, and growth 
factors for the period 1990- 2003. The study found that size and value/growth are 
important factors in explaining the stock returns with a negative correlation. 
 
Following those findings, it could be concluded that macroeconomic indicators as 
transmission channel play a significant role in real estate performance. And there is a 
positive correlation between real estate return levels and some macroeconomic factors 
such as GDP and foreign direct investment. Subsequently, if Brexit is expected to 
depress such transmission channels, as previously explained, it should be forecasted 
that real estate companies would experience an adverse reaction to the foreseen 
repercussions. Alternatively, if Brexit could have positive side-effects on other markets, 
the opposite response would be expected. Positive side-effects could evolve from 
possible re-allocations, as discussed by Schelkle (2018) and recorded by Knight-Frank 
(2018). The move-out of major institutions to other Member states could create a 
demand shock, especially for the office market, followed by a price increase and 
consequently positive reaction from real estate companies to capitalize on such 
opportunity. 
 
The magnitude of the reaction should follow the degree of exposure to those 
repercussions, positive or negative, exhibiting asymmetric reaction. But as the full 
Brexit implications are still unknown, “hard” or “soft” it is believed that the response 
of the real estate companies would, merely, follow the expected consequences revealed 
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by the chronological news and information that shed light on the magnitude of such 
consequences.  
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4 Event Study  
 
One of the employable methods to empirically test the real estate companies’ reaction 
to Brexit event is the application of the event study on securitized real estate. Following 
the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, et al., 1969; Fama, 1970), the real estate equity 
market is expected to react to Brexit-related events that deemed unexpected. 
Furthermore, the reaction should be per the expected consequences of that event. If an 
event is expected to positively impact the performance, the response should be positive 
and vice versa.  There is abundant literature that employs the event study methodology 
aiming to investigate the equity market reaction to a relevant event. It is well 
documented that the equity markets sensitively react to the information revealed from 
related news and announcements. 
 
4.1. Theoretical Framework  
 
To tackle the study in a theoretical frame, it should be recognized that the event study 
descends from the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The EMH extends the random-
walk hypothesis, which, in principle, claim that future performance of returns is 
independent of past performance. It implies that the stock market has “no memory” of 
the past to predict the future as delineated by Malkiel (2003).  
 
Fama (1970) proposed that for a capital market to be efficient, it has to comprehensively 
reflect all the available information. His hypothesis suggested three forms of efficiency, 
“trichotomy” as put by Schwartz (1970). First, the weak form, where market returns 
reflect historical information on prices. Second, semi-strong form where market returns 
reflect both the historical information (prices) and all available public information. 
Third, the strong form where the returns reflect the previous categories of information, 
in addition to, exclusive information known only by insiders, floor traders or privileged 
group of investors. Worth highlighting that Sharpe (1970) criticized the definition of 
the price by Fama (1970). Where the latter implied that returns and prices are the same, 
the former argued that returns are not prices but also dividends. Hence, historical 
information on returns or “adjusted prices” should alter the historical information on 
prices. 
 
In the “weak” form, the author discussed the distinction of the EMH from the random-
walk theory. He argued that even if the successive prices are independent of each other, 
the evidential change in prices is sufficient to present a reflection of new information. 
In the “strong” form, he relied on Niederhoffer & Osborne (1966) findings. Those 
findings suggest that stock floor traders and corporation insiders have exclusive access 
to information that could be exploited to gain excess returns. Fama (1970) suggested 
using “strong” form only as “benchmark” for market efficiency, meaning that any 
deviation from efficiency could be attributed to the existence of insiders. 
 
Although both “weak” and “strong” form of market efficiencies are cardinal, the event 
study framework could be more concerned with the semi-strong form. It implies that 
market returns would be adjusted to the available public “new” information. In his 
paper, Fama (1970) braced the hypothesis on the semi-strong form by a “limited” as he 
stated, precedent empirical studies. For instance, he referred to his work with Fisher, 
Jensen, and Roll (Fama, et al., 1969). In those studies, the stock split events were 
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studied to test for stock’s abnormal returns around the event. They utilized the market 
model and residual analysis, where regression analysis was used to regress market 
return on a specific stock return, and the residuals were considered as a deviation from 
normal returns. That deviation is called abnormal return caused by the event. The 
analysis was applied on the monthly data for 940 stock split events, covering the span 
of 33 years from 1927 to 1959 extracted from the New York Stock Exchange.  
 
In the paper, it was concluded that stock market experiences an abnormal return during 
the period between the split announcement and the execution of the split. Moreover, 
the market doesn’t react to the event per se, as the split process doesn’t increase claim 
on equity, but rather because the market perceives the split announcement as a signal 
of confidence where future higher dividends are expected. Those two conclusions were 
built on the observations after the split execution. It was observed that, first, if the 
higher profit is realized after the split, no further abnormal movement in the stock return 
is found. This observation implies that the market already priced in the news of the 
splits during the announcement period. Second, if the expected high dividends didn’t 
materialize a sharp decrease after the split takes place and rest at close levels before the 
split nearly by 5 months, which is the average announcement time, that observation 
implies that the increase in returns between the split announcement and the split is a 
reaction to the new information of a split event. It confirms the first conclusion and 
underpins that the market reacts to the consequences of the event, not to the event per 
se.  
 
To further brace the above conclusions, the literature on political elections events and 
their impacts on the financial markets would be referenced. (Nippani & Medlin, 2002; 
Nippani & Arize, 2005; Knight, 2006; Ferri, 2008; Al-Ississ & Miller, 2013; 
Hachenberg, et al., 2017). Knight (2006) shows that firms which favored Bush over 
Gore in the 2000 elections gained 9 to 16 percent higher returns during Bush 
administration. In related work, Ferri (2008) presents how the Bosh victory in 2004 led 
to a positive stock market reaction. More recently, Hachenberg et al. (2017) studied the 
effect of Donald Trump’s victory in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections on bank stocks 
and credit default swaps (CDS). An overall positive reaction was experienced by the 
banks during the event window, (nearly 4.5 percent of abnormal returns on average). 
The Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), for example, Bank of America and 
Citigroup gained more returns, 7.7% in contrast to non-G-SIBs, which earned only 
2.88% for the same event window. Same results were found for the CDS, where CDS 
spreads for non-G-SIBS increased significantly compared to those for G-SIBs. 
Although the winning of one candidate over another per se will not directly impact the 
market performance, market reaction was, however, witnessed. That reaction could be 
attributed to the expectations of how the winning candidate's agenda could impact 
market performance. 
 
In relevance to the macroeconomy, Waud (1970) examined the market reaction around 
the announcement of a change in the interest rate by the Federal Reserve Banks. The 
study employed the same residual method of Fama et al. (1969). The market was 
proxied by the daily return on the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 covering the period 
from 1952 to 1967. The sample included sixteen increases in discount rates and no 
decrease. Interestingly, the study finds, however, statistically significant, little effect of 
the announcement on the first trading day. The first trading day is the “first effective 
day of the discount rate,” succeeding the announcement. More interestingly, abnormal 
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observations were found in the days preceding the announcements. Waud (1970) 
regarded those results as market anticipation for the announcement or leak of 
information by a “tip-off.” Fama (1970) employed those findings to support further his 
“semi-strong” form, where the market already reacted to the anticipated (leaked) new 
information and priced in the expectation. In sum, the hypothesis put forward that the 
market place is rational and respond to new information. 
 
The hypothesis and findings of those early studies are paramount for studying market 
reaction to Brexit events. Underpinning the EMH, it should be predicted that the market 
will react to the news and announcements of Brexit. More specifically, when those 
announcements are perceived as new information that alters expectations. Careful 
attention would be given to the fact that markets don’t react to the event per se, rather 
the likely repercussions, that motivates the market to respond. Hence, real estate 
companies are not expected to react to the mere events yet, for the perceived forecasted 
implications (macroeconomic conditions) of those events on their performance. Since 
different companies constitute different characteristics and accordingly different 
exposure level, theoretically, the asymmetric reaction should be witnessed. Asymmetry 
in reaction could also be exhibited merely due to the company's own perception and 
assessment of the implications.  
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4.2.  Literature review on event studies 
 
The history of the event studies dates back to a study published by Dolley (1933) when 
an examination for the stock market reaction to 95 split events between 1921 and 1931 
was carried-out (MacKinlay, 1997). A substantial number of studies succeeded 
afterward. These studies can be segmented by the nature of the event under study. While 
some focused on firms’ specific events, for instance, Fama, et al. (1969) examined the 
stock split event, and Conrad et al. (2002) analyzed market response to good and bad 
earnings shocks. Others were concerned with broader world events.  
 
Niederhoffer (1971) carried out the first “in scientific fashion” study on the relationship 
between world events and stock prices movements. The study applied information 
content analysis on news’ headlines. First, 432 and 399 observations were collected 
from the New York Times and the Los Angeles Times publications, respectively, 
covering the period between 1950 and 1966. Second, the observations (headlines) are 
categorized based on their content into a wide range of events, for example, war 
development, peace meeting, sickness and death, cure, elections, change in foreign 
leadership...etc, and sorted by their day and month of occurrence. Then classified on 
good/bad scale and, to isolated and non-isolated events. 
 
Additionally, the events were labeled crises or not based on their frequency of 
appearance in the headlines. The study then tracked the stock market movements in the 
five days immediately following the event date to see if the change in the stock market 
after a world event is more extensive than other random trading days. It is found that 
the stock market tends to react more pronouncedly after a world event than on other 
random days where the magnitude of reaction is proportional to the size of the event. 
Moreover, the study found that the magnitude of a response after a crisis is more 
significant than that of an isolated event. That early literature aided in signaling the 
event study methodology as a viable approach, where many studies succeed.   
 
Giving the unique character of  Brexit, there is scarce to null literature that could be 
deemed as similar in the context of an event study. Close studies could be those that 
study the effect of the macro-prudential regulatory reforms. A study by Schwert (1981) 
is considered to be the first in that regard. The study analyzed the stock market reaction 
to the announcements of a change in inflation rates using stock market daily returns. 
Standard and Poor’s index was used as a proxy for the market portfolio. The proposition 
was if the official announcements carry-on a piece of new information on unexpected 
inflation or deflation, a market reaction should be witnessed. Otherwise, it is 
hypothesized that the market already anticipated the news, considering that the 
Consumer Price Index (C.P.I.) takes a month to collect the prices before formally 
announce it. The existence of transmission channels was hypothesized due to the 
distributive impacts of unexpected inflation on taxes, interest rates (Fama, 1975; Fama, 
1976), and future expected inflation. 
 
Moreover, it was linked to a possible regulation change that would aim to control prices, 
all of which would reflect on the firm’s value forcing its equity prices to react. The 
study didn’t calculate the abnormal returns, as typical, but rather estimated the 
unexpected returns and then regressed the stock returns on the unexpected return 
controlling for other variables and used the coefficient on the unexpected return 
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variable as a piece of evidence for market reaction. The findings concluded a negative 
reaction around the event period, but no significant reaction was observed on the 
announcement date, suggesting a probable leakage during the prices collection process 
and a lack in the market response to the announcement 
 
The most recent studies were conducted after the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) to 
scrutinize the impact of related reforms on different sectors and to test the hypothesized 
transmission channels. Those reforms were targeting various financial institutions 
and/or segments. They aim to regulate further and strengthen the financial system.  
 
On the national level, Schäfer et al. (2015) examined the effect of national financial 
regulatory reforms on the banking sector by using banking equity prices and credit 
default swaps. For the period June 2009 to September 2011. The study focused on the 
Dodd-Frank Act in the USA, Vickers reports in the UK, the restructuring law and bank 
levy in Germany and too-big-to-fail regulation in Switzerland. To capture the event 
dates, he relied on the renowned newspapers, for example, Financial Times for both 
UK, USA and Germany, and Neue Zurcher Zeitung for Switzerland, besides internet 
searches. Those prudential reforms aimed to control the banking sector’s volatility. As 
they are restricting particular activities, it is hypothesized that the reforms will hinder 
the sector from engaging in specific businesses and ultimately reduce its profitability. 
Accordingly, an adverse reaction would be present. The study not only collected the 
national regulation announcements under review but also confounding international 
events, to control for their effect. Although the mainstream of the response was 
negative, there was a divergence in the magnitude of the reaction between institutions. 
The divergence was a result of the different characteristics those institutions have. For 
example, the study finds systematic banks to be more negatively affected than non-
systematic banks. Based on that, it could be concluded that those characteristics prone 
those institutions a different degree of exposure to the event repercussions. The original 
model was, then, tuned with different estimation windows and market portfolios, local 
and global to test for robustness. Although the effects were the same, it was outlined 
that the estimated size of the impact depends on the benchmark index.  
 
In the same regard, for Dodd-Frank Act, Sorokina & Thornton Jr. (2015) investigated 
the reaction of different industries, for example, Trading, Real Estate, Precious 
metal…etc. The study was carried-out after exploring the change in systematic risk 
during the initial development of Dodd-Frank. It is found that, although the Act targets 
the financial institutions, non- financial institutions reacted as well. For elaboration, the 
financial firms’ systematic risk decreased, while the non-financial firms’ systematic 
risk increased. Also, the study suggested that more profitable firms with higher gearing 
levels and book-to-value ratio reacted more significantly to the Act. Thus, it has been 
revealed that an event could indeed have a spillover effect, and an institution-specific 
characteristic could play a role in the reaction level and direction. For further studies 
on Dodd-Frank, see Gao et al. (2013) and Fier & Liebenberg (2013). 
 
The closest study, to our research, is the one carried-out by Hoesli et al. (2017). That 
study extends the application of the event study to an international level. It scrutinized 
the real estate market reaction during the development and enactment of Basel III, the 
Alternative Investment Fund Management Directive (AIFMD), and the European 
Market Infrastructure Regulation (EMIR) reforms. It focused on European domiciled 
companies, the UK, Germany, and France markets, using listed real estate data. Three 
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hypotheses were proposed, “profit-based” hypothesis, which conjectures a positive 
market reaction resulting from a more resilient financial system,  reduction in costs of 
systematic risks and cheaper costs of debt. A “regulatory burden” hypothesis that 
assumes more restrictive regulation would lead to less credit availability, consequently 
increased costs of borrowing, which eventually turn to an adverse reaction from the real 
estate market. Lastly, “irrelevance” hypothesis, meaning that no noticeable response 
would be observed, implying that the real estate sector is irrelevant to those regulatory 
changes. It could be inferred that the study was testing costs of debt as a transmission 
channel between the reform and the market reaction.   
 
The results exhibited asymmetric responses toward the three regulatory reforms, across 
regulation, countries, and company-specific attributes. Besides, it recorded a change in 
the sampled companies’ market beta. Accordingly, the central theme was a different 
reaction due to different characteristics and the subsequent degree of exposure. For 
example, the response toward AIFMD maintained the highest significance, giving that 
AIFMD targets funds structures which could directly affect the real estate markets. In 
the same regard, companies with higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratio seemed to react more 
extensively, but insignificantly, to Basel III. Sampled companies’ market beta didn’t 
change in the case of Basel III but increased significantly for AIFMD. It was also 
noticed that France and Germany experienced a more pronounced reaction to AIFMD, 
due to their companies’ size and the basis of legal structure. It was also interesting to 
find that for 50% of the events related to AFMID, companies reacted positively, which 
has been attributed to their ability to diversify their source of funding and taking 
advantage of arbitrage opportunities. EMIR present the least impact on the companies 
that were sampled in the study.  
 
More on real estate sector-related event studies, Fuller et al. (2019) examined the effect 
of reclassifying Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) in Standard and Poor’s 500 
(S&P 500) from the Financials sector, to a new sector under the name Real Estate. The 
sample included the 27 REITs that were registered at the S&P 500 index in Q3, 2016. 
The effect was tested by calculating the abnormal returns (the difference between the 
actual return and the expected return) in an event window of 11 days (-5, +5). The 
findings displayed a mixed response in the abnormal return on the event day. Before 
and after the event date, the reaction was negative and positive, respectively. 
Correspondingly, the results for the average abnormal returns were significant before 
and after the event but insignificant on the event day. In the same study, using the same 
data, different event windows were tested with four models, market model, market-
adjusted model, Fama-French-Three-Factor model, and the same latter model augment 
with the Momentum Factor. The results confirmed a significant negative average 
abnormal return before the event and a significant positive one after it.  
 
Interestingly, unlike the frequent use of the stock market prices in an event study, Jung 
& Lee (2017) used direct house transaction prices to examine the impact of regulations 
that limits the Debt-To-Income (DTI) and Loan-To-Value (LTV) ratios on the housing 
prices. Given the expected delay in market response due to the illiquidity characteristic 
of the direct investments, the event window was (-5, +5 months). Two models were 
used in the examination, the Constant Mean Return model (CMR) and the Market 
Return model (MR). Over the period 2006-2015, the number of regulation events was 
515, 164 LTV-related, and 351 DTI-related, those events were further sorted to 
loosening and tightening regulation events. It has been found that the tightening 
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regulations have a post-event significant negative impacts on house prices growth, on 
the contrary, the loosening regulation has a significant positive effect on prices growth, 
both results were observed after 6 months and 2 to 4 months respectively. 
 
The literature that employs event methodology on a broad level, for several events and 
yield significant results (Schäfer, et al., 2015; Sorokina & Thornton Jr., 2015; Hoesli, 
et al., 2017; Jung & Lee, 2017) braces the validity of the methodology application in 
investigating the real estate market reaction to Brexit. Also, they refer to the existence 
of the transmission channels that links the expected consequences to market reaction. 
On top of that, they highlight the role of the entity characteristics in determining the 
degree of exposure to the effects. It is crucial, however, to understand the limitations of 
such a methodology.  
 
Binder (1985b) aimed to examine the power of the event study in capturing the effect 
of a regulatory change through testing the statistical significance of several null-
hypothesizes. The study covered 20 regulations during the period 1887-1978, using 
stock market data in an event study framework. Examples of the regulations understudy 
are Interstate Commerce Act 1887 and Airline Deregulation Act 1987. The 
announcements were collected from various resources but mainly, Wall Street Journal 
and New York Times. Noting that only announcements that were believed to contain 
new or unanticipated information are included. By using both daily and monthly stock 
returns and applying a disaggregated multivariate regression analysis, the abnormal 
returns for each stock/firm were estimated. It was concluded that using daily stock data 
has advantages over monthly data. However, both daily and monthly data show a 
regulatory change effect that is statistically insignificant. Binder attributed the weak 
significance to a misspecification of the announcement date as the regulatory change 
takes a long period to be negotiated before enactment. Accordingly, the announcements 
hardy withhold new/unanticipated information. But the study suggested that the 
methodology is still valid if the announcements containing new information could be 
precisely specified. 
 
Schäfer et al. (2015) argued the predictability assumption proposed by Binder (1985b). 
They used the same model as Binder (1985b) and found significant results. Schäfer et 
al. (2015) argued by saying, “The process produces compromises and surprises, tougher 
or weaker regulation than initially expected and therefore new information for 
markets.” But, anecdotally, agreed with MacKinlay (1997) that event study is not 
suitable for studying international regulations due to the involvement of several parties 
and the difficulty in controlling information leakage. Thus, the expectations are 
constantly priced-in instead of suddenly shocking the market. On the other side, Hoesli 
et al. (2017) extended the application to an international level, without stating an 
argument in that regard. It worth mentioning that Hoesli et al. (2017) found in his study 
that some events present more frequent significant responses than others, the highest 
percentages of significant responses were 67, 45 and 34 percent for AIFMD, Basel III, 
and EMIR respectively. Accordingly, less frequent significant responses could be 
attributed to the involvement of several parties in such international events and the 
available degree of precision in specifying the event dates and/or identify 
announcements that actually carry new information (Brown & Warner, 1980; Binder, 
1985b; Lamdin, 2001). 
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Based on that, the credibility of employing the event study methodology in 
investigating the real estate market reaction to Brexit, remarkably, hinges on the 
accuracy of identifying the right event. The right event should be considered 
unexpected and holds information that would force the market to shockingly react.   
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5 Data and Methodology 
 
5.1. Methodology 
 
The assumption of the real estate market rationality and the EMH’s semi-strong form 
considerations motivate this study to employ the event study methodology (for 
alternatives see Brown & Warner (1980) and Joskow & Rose (1989)). For a definition, 
“an event study measures the impact of a specific event on the value of a firm” 
(MacKinlay, 1997). For more elaboration, an event study is concerned with estimating 
abnormal return which could be defined as the actual return of stock during the event 
less the normal return that would be expected, had no such event take place. In essence, 
event studies test the market efficiency, to the extent that the event is unanticipated and 
carry news that alters expectations. The persistent existence of abnormal return, long 
after the event, implies that the market lacks efficiency to swiftly reflect the newly 
disclosed information by that event (Brown & Warner, 1980). In this study, the 
estimation steps suggested by MacKinlay (1997) will be followed, amended by the 
considerations proposed by Lamdin (2001). 
 
5.2. Estimation Procedure 
 
 Event Selection 
 
Brexit concludes numerous chronological events and announcements. It could be 
claimed that it started in 2013 when the Prime Minister of UK, David Cameron pledged 
an in/out referendum in case the Conservative Party win the general elections. Up till 
the time at which this study is being conducted, and further events are expected to come. 
The milestones on Brexit’s timeline so far could be the Referendum, Invoking Article 
50, reaching a withdrawal agreement and the Meaningful Vote“s” (for detailed Brexit 
time-line see Walker (2019)). Precisely specifying the events that could be regarded as 
unexpected is challenging, giving the international level of those events. Furthermore, 
the involvement of several domains, national and international, in the decision-making 
process prone the information to a leakage. A possible leakage would lead to a gradual 
pricing-in for that information by the market rather than witnessing a significant 
abnormal return at any specific period (MacKinlay, 1997; Binder, 1985a). 
 
As the validity of an event study is considerably contingent on specifying the 
unpredictable announcements, this study will select the Referendum results 
announcements date as the event date (24th of June 2016). The choice is justified by the 
voting mechanism of Referendums. It is hard to expect the vote of each and every voter. 
Thus it was hard rather impossible to predict the results of the referendum. More 
importantly, the fact that the results were nearly fifty-fifty (48,1% remain and 51,9% 
leave) further support the choice to claim that the Referendum withheld unanticipated 
news to the real estate market. 
 
 
 
  
 
25 
 Event Window 
 
The event window is the period over which the market reaction is going to be observed 
for the event under study. A short event window will be selected to avoid a 
contaminated reaction considering the event level and the probability of confounding 
events. Hence, the event window will be 4 trading days (-1,0,+1 +2).  
 
 A pre-event period (t = -1) to count for the voting day and subsequent 
anticipations;  
 The day of the event (t = 0) and; 
 A post-event period (t = +1) and (t = +2) taking into consideration the 
differences in time zones between countries in which the companies under 
study operate, and a possible delay in market reaction.  
 
 
 Estimation Window 
 
By definition, the Abnormal Returns (ARs) is a deviation from the normal performance. 
The estimation window is the span of time selected to estimate normal performance 
(returns). Following the suggested estimation window by MacKinlay (1997) and 
applied by Fuller et al. (2019), 120 trading days will be appointed as the estimation 
window. The estimation window will start one trading day prior to the event window (t 
= -2) and ends at (t = -121). For robustness, estimation widow of 80 days will be 
examined as well. 
 
 Modeling 
 
The aim of a model specified for an event study is to estimate the normal returns and 
the ARs. The market Equation, initially proposed by Markowitz (1959), will be 
employed to estimate the normal returns. That Equation advocate that a stock return is 
a function of a constant (a mean) and market’s portfolio performance (beta). 
 
Traditionally, to estimate the ARs, a two-stage OLS regression equation is model. That 
model aims to analyze the residuals as it represents the abnormal returns, for example, 
see Fama et al. (1969) and recently, Fuller et al. (2019). This study will, instead, use 
the “Parametized” model as named by Lamdin (2001). The Parametized model is, in 
principle, the market model supplemented by a dummy variable to capture the abnormal 
returns. That approach was originated by Izan (1978). It allows the constant to vary 
around the event that is represented by a dummy variable. The method has been used 
in several studies, e.g. Binder (1985a), Schäfer et al. (2015) and Hoesli et al. (2017). It 
has been argued that the Parametized model is more efficient for estimations as it 
accounts for high cross-sectional correlations in the residual of the multivariate 
regression. The high cross-sectional correlations are induced from the fact that the 
announcements affect all the companies at the same event date (Hoesli, et al., 2017). 
 
Additionally, using the multivariate regression model gives an advantage of testing 
joint hypotheses. In the same context, as the event would affect all the companies of 
the same industry, the model will be further amended by an industry return variable. 
Adding an industry index is an attempt to decrease the variance in the abnormal returns 
(MacKinlay, 1997), and improve the power of estimations. Salinger (1992) found that 
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the inclusion of industry index reduces the standard errors of the estimates by roughly 
30%. The R-square will be referenced to test the model's power of estimation for 
variables inclusion. The model will be estimated in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
(SUR) framework.  That framework was suggested by (Zellner, 1962). It allows for 
gaining more efficiency in calculating the standard error as it takes into consideration 
the cross-section correlation  (Binder, 1985a; Schäfer, et al., 2015). 
 
To answer the research question, the Abnormal Returns (ARs) will be estimated and 
analyzed based on Equation (1): 
 
Equation (1) 
𝑅1𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛾1𝑅𝑁𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿1𝑛
𝑇+2
𝑛=𝑇−1
𝐸1𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀1𝑡  
…. 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝑅𝑁𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖𝑛
𝑇+2
𝑛=𝑇−1
𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
…. 
𝑅𝐼𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼 + 𝛽𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑡 + 𝛾𝐼𝑅𝑁𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝐼𝑛
𝑇+2
𝑛=𝑇−1
𝐸𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝜀𝐼𝑡  
 
Where 
𝑅𝑖𝑡 denote the return of company i at time t. 
𝛼𝑖  denote the constant of company i 
𝛽𝑖  denote the market beta of company i 
𝛾𝑖  denote the industry beta of company i 
𝑅𝑀𝑡 denote the market return at time t (same for all companies) 
𝑅𝑁𝑡 denote the industry return at time t (same for all companies) 
𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑡  denote a dummy variable that represents the event: equals 1 if event 
n occur on time t and 0 otherwise 
𝛿𝑖𝑛 denote the influence of event n on the return of company i, 
(Abnormal Return) 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 denote the error term/random disturbance 
 
The dummy coefficient 𝛿𝑖𝑛 measure the abnormal returns (ARs) for company i, while 
𝑅𝑁𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑅𝑀𝑡 are the industry’s portfolio and market’s portfolio return respectively 
proxied by a benchmark. The choice of a benchmark for those two portfolio’s 
performances is a question of robustness. Schäfer et al. (2015) and Hoesli et al. (2017) 
mentioned that the use of global index reduces the contamination effect results from 
the interdependence between different industries within the same country and the 
spillover effect across countries, respectively. However, considering that those 
variables aim to estimate the normal returns of the companies under study by providing 
a market portfolio proxy, the global index might not accurately reflect the market 
portfolio because it might fail to reflect country-specific performance. Accordingly, in 
this study, both local and global index will be tested. T is the day of the Referendum’s 
result announcement.   
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 𝐸𝑖𝑛𝑡  represents the events’ dummy variable. Lamdin (2001) suggested three 
alternatives for the event dummy variable representation in the multivariate regression 
model. (1) A separate dummy for each sub-event within the event, (2) a single dummy 
to represent the entire event window (i.e., all periods in the window), or (3) a single 
dummy to represent only the individual sub-event within the event window. Alternative 
(1) is advantageous to track the impact of each sub-event, to observe the reaction 
direction, positive or negative, and to test the null hypothesis for each sub-event 
separately (Binder, 1985b). However, misspecification of the event's date is probable. 
On the other hand, alternative (2) is more able to capture the effect of the event 
nevertheless the positive and negative effect of each sub-events will not be traceable, 
resulting in a misleading total effect. Also, the inclusion of non-relevant dates is 
possible. Alternative (3) is a compromisation between the first two. As the research 
scope is limited to only one sub-event (Referendum), Alternative (1) will be followed 
using a dummy variable for each day in the event window, instead of one dummy for 
the whole window. Accordingly, the results will be able to track the reaction direction 
(negative/positive) during the event window and avoid the discharge effect. 
 
In order to test the study hypothesis, first, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for each 
sampled company will be calculated according to Equation (2). Second, the CAR for 
each company i will be regressed on the company’s exposure to the UK market as it is 
assumed to reflect the negative repercussions of Brexit. Additionally, the company’s 
exposure to possible re-allocation benefits will be tested. For the latter test, German and 
French markets will be sampled (company’s exposure to German/French market). The 
choice of Germany and France comes from the fact that they are the second biggest 
listed real estate market after the UK (EPRA, 2017; EPRA, 2019) and more importantly 
because they are prominent candidates for hosting the re-allocations (Knight-Frank, 
2018). Accordingly, they are hypothesized to reflect the possible positive side-effects 
of Brexit. The exposure will be tested on both the company-level and country level for 
the UK market, But only on company-level for German and French market 
 
Equation (2) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡0, 𝑡𝑁) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡
𝑡=𝑁
𝑡=0
 
Where 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 denote the cumulative abnormal return of company i. 
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 denote the abnormal returns of company i at time t 
𝑡 denote the time interval at the cumulative abnormal return for 
company i will be summed 
 
 
On the company level, Equation (3), the company will be considered exposed to the 
tested market (UK, Germany, or France), if it directly invests in that market through 
property ownership. The level of exposure will be calculated as the ratio of the number 
of properties owned in the market that is assumed to reflect Brexit repercussion to the 
total number of properties owned by the company. A negative coefficient is 
hypothesized for exposure to the UK market, while a positive one is assumed for both 
the French and German markets. A significant coefficient on the company’s exposure 
variable would confirm those hypotheses (the research hypotheses). The equation will 
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be augmented by the company’s size, debt to capital ratio, and tax status as control 
variables. The reason for choosing those variables is their significance in explaining the 
variance in a real estate company return. The tax status is whether the company is a 
Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) or a Real Estate Operating Company (REOC) for 
literature on the difference in characterizes see Niskanen & Falkenbach (2012). The 
company size will be proxied by its market capital at the date of the event. Furthermore, 
the company’s sector and investment focus will be examined. As the re-allocations are 
expected to pressure the demand on offices and the rental market, Equation (3) will be 
augmented by a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the company’s sector is office and 
0 otherwise, as well as, a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the company's investment 
focus is rental and 0 otherwise. 
 
Equation (3) 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜕𝑖𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝑈𝐾𝑖 + +𝜋𝑖𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖 + +∞𝑖𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖
+ 𝜆𝑖  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + ∝𝑖 𝐷𝑡𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖 + ∅𝑖𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇𝑖 + Ω𝑖𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖
+ µ𝑖𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖  
 
Where 
𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝑈𝐾𝑖 denotes the level of exposure of company i to the UK market. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝐺𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑖 denotes the level of exposure of company i to the German market. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝_𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 denotes the level of exposure of company i to the French market. 
𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 denotes the logged  market capital (free float) of company i 
𝐷𝑡𝑜𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖 denotes the debt to capital ratio of the company i 
𝑅𝐸𝐼𝑇𝑖 denotes a dummy that represents the tax status of company i 
(equals 1 if the company is REIT and 0 otherwise) 
𝑅𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖 denotes a dummy that represents the investment focus of company i 
(equals 1 if the company is Rent focused and 0 otherwise) 
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑖 denotes a dummy that represents the sector to which company i 
belongs 
(equals 1 if the company’s sector is office and 0 otherwise) 
𝜀𝑖  denote the error term/random disturbance. 
 
On a country level, Equation (4), the CAR will be regressed on the trading intensity 
between the country-of-incorporation and the UK. The trading intensity will be measured 
as the ratio between the country’s export of goods to the UK and its total exports to the 
EU in the year of the event, 2016. The values will range from 0 (least exposure) to 1 
(highest exposure). Companies that are incorporated in the United Kingdom are assumed 
to have the highest exposure and according will take the value of 1. The GDP of 
company’s country-of-incorporation will augment the Equation as a control variable 
referencing the literature suggestions, that GDP has power in explaining the real estate 
market returns (Case, et al., 2000; Bełej & Cellmer, 2014; Delfim & Hoesli, 2016) 
  
  
 
29 
 
 
Equation (4) 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜕𝑖𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑡 + 𝜆𝑖log _𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
 
Where 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒_𝐼𝑛𝑡 denotes the ratio between the company i’s country of 
incorporation export of goods to the UK and its total 
exports intra -EU.  
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 denotes logged country-of-incorporation’s GDP of the 
company i 
𝜀𝑖 denote the error term/random disturbance. 
 
 
5.3. Data 
 
 Observation Intervals 
 
Some event studies used monthly data (Brown & Warner, 1980; Schipper & Thompson, 
1983; Jung & Lee, 2017), while many others used daily data (Schäfer, et al., 2015; 
Hoesli, et al., 2017; Fuller, et al., 2019). Morse (1984) investigated the choice between 
daily and monthly data. The study focused on the level of efficiency and bias of the 
estimates of the mean of abnormal returns using daily and monthly data. It found no 
superiority for either; however, daily returns are preferable in many cases.  That is 
consistent with Brown & Warner (1980) that suggested monthly data might spill noise 
on the true event effect. Brown & Warner (1985) analyzed the impact of the daily data 
characteristics on the event study and suggested that the inherited downsides of the 
daily data, for example, autocorrelation and non-normality, do not impact the power of 
the event study. Also, because Brexit is an international event and the study will utilize 
company’s specific data, using monthly intervals will hinder the ability to control, if 
needed, for company’s particular events that might confound in the same month or 
week with Brexit events, for example, earning announcements. Thus, following Schäfer 
et al. (2015), Hoesli et al. (2017) and Fuller et al. (2019), this research will use daily 
data intervals. 
 
Based on that, the total daily returns are selected to represent the companies' return. For 
the market portfolio STOXX Europe, 600 will be chosen, while for the industry 
portfolio FTSE EPRA Nareit developed Europe will be selected. Worth mentioning that 
the total return index for both portfolios will be selected rather than the mere change in 
price, following the argument of  Sharpe (1970). The data is retrieved from Eikon-
DataStream. For the robustness test, FTSE developed Europe as a market portfolio will 
be examined as well. Besides, local indices will be used by sampling Germany, because 
the German market is considered as a candidate for future re-allocation and the German 
companies represent the second biggest share in the study sample and the overall listed 
real estate market, following British companies. 
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 Data Sample 
 
The sample consists of 52 companies. The reason for choosing those companies is data 
availability and limitations. Other companies have unreported returns for the period of 
examination (Jan 2015 to July 2016), or they have not been publicly listed one year 
before the event.   All the sampled companies have been listed at least one year before 
the event, to allow for a more accurate normal returns estimations. 46 companies are 
incorporated in an EU Member State while 6 are incorporated in non-EU Member State. 
33 of the companies are REITs while the other 19 are REOCs. The countries in our 
sample are United Kingdom, Germany, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Austria, 
Norway, and Switzerland. The number of observations for each company is the sum of 
the trading days of the event window plus those of the estimation window, (t = -121 to 
t = +2). All the sampled companies are constituents of the FTSE EPRA Nareit 
Developed Europe at the time of the event. They represent 57 % of the total number of 
European companies (92) constituted the index at the event date. It weighs over 70% 
of the total index’s free-float market capital, see table 5. The company’s market-capital, 
its REIT status, sector, and investment focus are collected from EPRA. The debt to total 
capital ratio is retrieved from Eikon, datastream, and property ownership and 
geographical location are sourced from S&P Global Market Intelligence. The trading 
volumes and the GDP data are extracted from both Eurostat and OECD. For the sample 
descriptive statistics, see table 6. 
 
Table 5 Sample Weights 
 
Country No. Of 
companies 
%Wght in Index %Wght in the sample 
Austria 1 0,54 0,76 
Belgium 7 3,03 4,26 
France 3 4,33 6,07 
Germany 10 18,95 26,59 
Italy 1 0,14 0,19 
Netherland 5 13,88 19,47 
Norway 2 0,39 0,54 
Switzerland 4 5,57 7,82 
United Kingdom 19 24,45 34,30 
Total 52 71,28 100 
Source: EPRA, 2016 
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Table 6 Sample descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Market 
Captial (Euro 
–million) 
52 2728.423 4041.671 210 23008 
Debt to 
Capital 
51 .3494466 .1127327 .1138055 .6606454 
Exp_UK 52 .3194119 .4355428 0% 100% 
Exp_Germany 52 .2087462 .377475 0% 100% 
Exp_France 52 .0659194 .1679186 0% 99% 
Office 52 .1730769 .3783431 0 1 
REIT 52 .4615385 .4985572 0 1 
rental 52 .7307692 .4435945 0 1 
Trade_Int 52 .4333329 .4319384 .0001387 1 
log (GDP) 52 41094.23 10606.16 27900 72300 
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6 Results 
 
The results were concluded in the following order: first, the Abnormal Returns (ARs) 
are estimated using Equation (1) to record companies’ reaction, then the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) are calculated according to Equation (2). Second, to test the 
research hypothesis, the CARs are regressed on the company’s level of exposure to 
three markets that are assumed to reflect Brexit repercussions, UK, Germany, and 
France, the regression follows Equation (3). The company is determined to be exposed 
to a specific market if it directly invests in it through property ownership. The level of 
exposure is the percentage of the number of properties owned in the affected market to 
the total number of properties. Lastly, to test whether the companies’ country-of-
incorporation and its trading relationship with the UK have power in explaining the 
reaction was investigated through regressing the CARs on the trading intensity between 
country-of incorporation and the UK. The trading intensity is measured as the ratio 
between the country’s export of goods to the UK and its total exports to the EU. 
 
After running Equation (1) in the SUR framework for the observations understudy, the 
results show a statistically significant Abnormal Normal Returns (ARs) from the 
sampled companies, see table 7. The largest statistically significant positive reaction 
recorded is 12,54% (% change in total daily returns) while the smallest is 1,3% for a 
British, and a French company respectively, with a mean of 4,0%. On the contrary, the 
highest statistically significant negative reaction witnessed is -15,2% whereas the 
lowest is -1,7% for a British, and a Dutch company respectively, with a mean of -5,8%. 
It is noticed that British companies considerably dominates the negative reactions; they 
represent 85% of the significantly negative observations. The rest of the 15% is equally 
distributed between Austria, Germany, Italy, Netherland, and Belgium with only one 
observation for each, except for Netherland, it has two observations. On the other hand, 
German companies dominate the significant positive reaction, with nearly 28% of the 
observations, followed by 12% for British companies. In the same regard, companies 
that are incorporated in Norway show no significant results during the 4 trading days 
of the event window.  
 
The number of significant results varies within the event window. On the event day (t 
= 0), 85 % (44 companies) of the sample presents a statistically significant ARs.  81% 
(36 companies) of those ARs were significant at the 0,01 level. On the post-event day 
(t = +1), the percentage was lower, where only 65% (34 companies) of the sample show 
a statistically significant ARs with 74% (25 companies) significant at the 0,01% level. 
On the day (t = +2) the significant ARs represents 32% (17 companies) with nearly half 
significant at the 0,01% level. For the day (t = -1) there is almost no statistically 
significant ARs from the sampled companies, only 3 companies with merely 0,1% level 
statistical significance.  For the complete results, standard errors and the R-square of 
the system of equations, see appendix I, pp. 1-2. 
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Table 7 The Estimated Abnormal Returns and their statistical significance. 
 
  Abnormal Returns 
Country of 
Incorporation 
Company Name 
Pre-
event (t 
=-1) 
Event 
(t = 0) 
Post-event 
(t =1) 
Post-event 
(t =2) 
Austria CA Immobilien 
Anlagen AG 
0.708 5.393*** 0.429 -1.727* 
Belgium Aedifica SA -0.187 5.746*** 0.541 0.875 
Belgium Befimmo SA 0.0434 3.872*** 0.885 -0.385 
Belgium Cofinimmo SA 0.216 2.920*** 1.777*** -0.202 
Belgium Intervest Offices & 
Warehouses NV 
1.794* 1.292 -1.105 0.802 
Belgium Leasinvest Real 
Estate SCA 
0.0698 4.314** 2.674* -5.810*** 
Belgium Warehouses de Pauw 
Comm VA 
-0.0920 4.703*** 3.912*** -0.942 
Belgium Wereldhave Belgium 
Comm VA 
-0.737 2.094 2.333 0.463 
France Covivio SA -0.229 5.069*** 2.173*** -0.463 
France Gecina SA 0.152 1.782** -0.604 1.323* 
France Mercialys SA -0.278 1.772* 1.770* 0.819 
Germany Adler Real Estate AG -0.142 5.542** 2.930 -2.105 
Germany alstria office REIT 
AG 
0.103 6.451*** 1.173 -0.398 
Germany Deutsche Euroshop 
AG 
-0.0576 3.971*** 1.088 0.0370 
Germany Deutsche Wohnen 
SE 
-0.388 8.177*** 5.671*** -0.801 
Germany DIC Asset AG -0.262 8.098*** 2.604** -1.027 
Germany Hamborner Reit AG 0.293 4.919*** 1.737* -0.153 
Germany LEG Immobilien AG -1.188 6.684*** 3.027*** -0.486 
Germany TAG Immobilien AG 0.242 5.392*** 2.780** -0.0602 
Germany TLG Immobilien AG -1.127 5.511*** 0.0833 -0.274 
Germany Vonovia SE -1.490 9.433*** 7.484*** -3.841*** 
Italy Immobiliare Grande 
Distribuzione SIIQ 
SpA 
-1.219 5.954*** 1.120 -3.460* 
Netherlands Eurocommercial 
Properties NV 
-0.895 1.824* 1.260 0.683 
Netherlands NSI NV -1.012 5.376*** -2.215** 0.713 
Netherlands Vastned Retail NV -0.941 3.157*** 1.796* -0.928 
Netherlands Wereldhave NV 0.539 1.694* 0.569 -1.027 
Netherlands WFD Unibail 
Rodamco NV 
0.418 2.878*** 2.427*** -1.723** 
Norway Entra ASA -1.023 0.881 0.140 1.338 
Norway Norwegian Property 
ASA 
-0.125 0.497 1.268 2.040 
Switzerland Allreal Holding AG -0.496 2.115*** 0.170 0.121 
Switzerland Mobimo Holding AG 0.324 2.918*** 1.594** -0.724 
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Switzerland PSP Swiss Property 
AG 
0.824 6.121*** -0.0747 -0.200 
Switzerland Swiss Prime Site AG -0.307 5.183*** 2.005*** -0.457 
United 
Kingdom 
Big Yellow Group 
PLC 
-0.282 -3.677** -2.595* 0.662 
United 
Kingdom 
British Land 
Company PLC 
-0.107 -9.817*** -5.188*** 1.804** 
United 
Kingdom 
Capital & Counties 
Properties PLC 
0.553 -6.856*** -6.350*** 2.682** 
United 
Kingdom 
Daejan Holdings 
PLC 
1.319 -3.296** -13.78*** 12.54*** 
United 
Kingdom 
Derwent London 
PLC 
-0.289 -15.18*** -7.964*** 3.308*** 
United 
Kingdom 
Grainger PLC 1.543 -8.157*** -4.632*** 1.804* 
United 
Kingdom 
Hammerson PLC 0.305 -4.557*** -4.398*** 3.092*** 
United 
Kingdom 
Hansteen Holdings 
PLC 
0.647 -1.213 -4.374*** 0.990 
United 
Kingdom 
Helical PLC 2.005 -12.31*** -9.568*** -3.096** 
United 
Kingdom 
Intu Properties PLC 0.426 -3.365*** -3.014*** 1.007 
United 
Kingdom 
Land Securities 
Group PLC 
-0.301 -5.931*** -4.632*** 5.515*** 
United 
Kingdom 
Londonmetric 
Property PLC 
0.730 -3.415*** -7.700*** 4.514*** 
United 
Kingdom 
Primary Health 
Properties PLC 
1.760* 0.485 -1.158 0.00259 
United 
Kingdom 
Safestore Holdings 
PLC 
0.173 -9.601*** -6.173*** 0.738 
United 
Kingdom 
SEGRO PLC 0.0549 -4.103*** -2.960*** 4.765*** 
United 
Kingdom 
Shaftesbury PLC 0.161 -1.158 -4.624*** 0.991 
United 
Kingdom 
Tritax Big Box Reit 
PLC 
0.782 -2.820*** -7.472*** 6.788*** 
United 
Kingdom 
Unite Group PLC 0.141 0.669 -4.009*** 0.533 
United 
Kingdom 
Workspace Group 
PLC 
2.680* -6.845*** -10.55*** 1.369 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
Within the event window, 42% of the statistically significant reactions are negative 
reactions in contrast to a majority of 58% positive reaction. The Coefficient of Variation 
(CV) for both negative and positive reactions is almost the same, which equals to 0,56. 
As both the event date (t = 0) and the trading day after (t = 1) sustain the most significant 
ARs with the highest levels of significance, they were further referenced for reaction- 
asymmetry investigation. The observed Abnormal Returns for (t = 0) and (t = 1) 
maintain a variation in both direction and magnitude, see table 8. It is found that on (t 
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= 0), 34 % of the statistically significant ARs were negative. While on (t = +1) the 
number increased to reach nearly 53%. Accordingly, on average, 44% of the sampled 
companies experienced a negative reaction while the rest harvest a positive one.  
 
Furthermore, the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard deviation to the 
mean) for both dates ARs is substantially greater than 1, which refers to a significant 
variance in those ARs.  All the companies that encountered significant negative ARs 
on those two dates are incorporated in the United Kingdom except for only one, 
incorporated in Netherland. However, that Dutch company encountered the least 
negative reaction -2,2 % within these two days. The most negative reaction for those 
two days is the same as for the whole event widow, -15,18% suffered by a British 
company. In the same context, the coefficient of variation (the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean) for the ARs at both dates (t = 0) and (t = +1) is substantially 
greater than 1, which refers to a significant variance in those ARs.  
 
Table 8  Abnormal Returns Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max *CV 
AR at (t = 0) 52 .7805 5.601511 -15.18 9.433 7.1768238 
(-) ARs 17 -6.017706 3.922778 -15.18 -1.158 .6518727 
(+) ARs 35 4.082486 2.343565 .485 9.433 .57405344 
       
AR at (t =1) 52 -1.109988 4.31708 -13.78 7.484 3.8893013 
(-) ARs 23 -5.006074 3.381007 -13.78 -.0747 .67538091 
(+) ARs 29 1.98001 1.614517 .0833 7.484 .81540845 
*Coefficient of Variation (absolute values)     
 
Equation (1) results were robust to the different tests. Using 80 days of estimation 
window yields nearly the same results of the positive and negative significant Abnormal 
returns, see Appendix I, pp. 3-4. Substituting Stoxx 600 with FTSE Developed Europe 
as a market portfolio displays on average the same magnitude of reaction, see Appendix 
I, pp. 5-6. Moreover, sampling the companies incorporated in Germany, using a local 
index (DAX) demonstrates the same positive reaction witnessed from using STOXX 
600 and the FTSE Developed Europe, see table 9. Germany was selected as it is the 
second-biggest real estate market after the United Kingdom. Also, most of the sampled 
companies are incorporated in Germany after the United Kingdom. Besides, the results 
show that German companies harvest most of the significant positive reaction observed. 
For the complete results, standard errors and the R-square of the system of equations, 
see Appendix I, p.7. 
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Table 9 The Estimated Abnormal Returns (using local index, German Case) 
 
  Abnormal Returns 
Country of 
Incorporation Company name 
Pre-event 
(t =-1) 
Event (t 
= 0) 
Post-event 
(t =1) 
Post-event 
(t =2) 
Germany Adler Real Estate AG -0.329 5.452** 2.827 -2.048 
 alstria office REIT AG 0.0925 6.124*** 1.037 -0.309 
 Deutsche Euroshop AG -0.0398 3.684*** 0.915 0.147 
 DIC Asset AG -0.263 8.150*** 2.567** -1.008 
 Deutsche Wohnen SE -0.406 7.400*** 5.217*** -0.514 
 Hamborner Reit AG 0.422 4.899*** 1.853* -0.215 
 LEG Immobilien AG -1.179 6.239*** 2.868*** -0.379 
 TAG Immobilien AG 0.181 5.862*** 2.997** -0.203 
 TLG Immobilien AG -1.116 5.370*** 0.164 -0.313 
 Vonovia SE -1.557* 9.231*** 7.396*** -3.785*** 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1     
 
 
Building on the results that depict high percentage of statistically significant ARs 
observed for (t = 0) and (t = +1), and the relative insignificance of the other dates of the 
event window, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are only calculated for (t = 
0) and (t = +1) employing Equation (2), see table 10. By estimating the CARs’ 
magnitude and direction, it is observed that nearly 63% of the companies (33 
companies) maintained the positive direction, while the other 37 % (19 companies) 
show a negative one. Only and all companies incorporated in the UK suffered negative 
CARs with the highest value of -23,1% and lowest of -0,7%. Companies incorporated 
in other countries experienced positive CARs. The largest positive CAR is 16,9% for a 
German Company while the smallest is 0,2% for a Belgium company. On average 
Germany show the largest positive CARs. Furthermore, the coefficient of variation for 
all CARs calculated preserved a value considerably greater than 1, see table 11.   
 
 
Table 10 The Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
 
Country Name CAR 
Austria CA Immobilien Anlagen AG 5,822 
Belgium Aedifica SA 6,287  
Befimmo SA 4,757  
Cofinimmo SA 4,697  
Intervest Offices & Warehouses NV 0,187  
Leasinvest Real Estate SCA 6,988  
Warehouses de Pauw Comm VA 8,615  
Wereldhave Belgium Comm VA 4,427 
France Covivio SA 7,242  
Gecina SA 1,178 
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Mercialys SA 3,542 
Germany Adler Real Estate AG 8,472  
alstria office REIT AG 7,624  
Deutsche Euroshop AG 5,059  
Deutsche Wohnen SE 13,848  
DIC Asset AG 10,702  
Hamborner Reit AG 6,656  
LEG Immobilien AG 9,711  
TAG Immobilien AG 8,172  
TLG Immobilien AG 5,5943  
Vonovia SE 16,917 
Italy Immobiliare Grande Distribuzione SIIQ SpA 7,074 
Netherlands Eurocommercial Properties NV 3,084  
NSI NV 3,161  
Vastned Retail NV 4,953  
Wereldhave NV 2,263 
  WFD Unibail Rodamco NV 5,305 
Norway Entra ASA 1,021  
Norwegian Property ASA 1,765 
Switzerland Allreal Holding AG 2,285  
Mobimo Holding AG 4,512  
PSP Swiss Property AG 6,0463  
Swiss Prime Site AG 7,188 
United 
Kingdom 
Big Yellow Group PLC -6,272 
British Land Company PLC -15,005 
Capital & Counties Properties PLC -13,206 
Daejan Holdings PLC -17,076  
Derwent London PLC -23,144  
Grainger PLC -12,789  
Hammerson PLC -8,955  
Hansteen Holdings PLC -5,587  
Helical PLC -21,878  
Intu Properties PLC -6,379  
Land Securities Group PLC -10,563  
Londonmetric Property PLC -11,115  
Primary Health Properties PLC -0,673  
Safestore Holdings PLC -15,774  
SEGRO PLC -7,063  
Shaftesbury PLC -5,782  
Tritax Big Box Reit PLC -10,292  
Unite Group PLC -3,34  
Workspace Group PLC -17,395 
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Table 11 Cumulative Abnormal Returns Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max *CV 
CARs 52 -.3294885 9.496436 -23.144 16.917 28.821758 
(-) CARs 19 -11.17305 6.127788 -23.144 -.673 .54844351 
(+) CARs 33 5.913776 3.548948 .187 16.917 .60011546 
*Coefficient of Variation (absolute values)     
 
After obtaining the CARs, the hypothesis test is carried out. The test aims to examine 
the level of exposure's ability to explain the variance in the CARs’ magnitude and 
direction. The level-of-exposure will be tested on both the company level and country-
of-incorporation level. 
 
On a company level, the examination looks for interpreting the negative reaction by the 
exposure level to the UK market and explaining the positive one through the exposure 
to the German and French markets (Markets of possible re-allocations). The analysis is 
carried out in two steps. First, the correlation coefficient matrix was estimated to test 
for possible multi-collinearity between the independent variables. Second, CARs are 
regressed on the independent variables following Equation (3). On a country level, the 
same steps are taken, but only the exposure to the UK market is investigated. The 
exposure is proxied by the trading intensity between the company's country-of-
incorporation and the UK.   
 
On the one hand, the correlation matrix demonstrates a significant correlation ( at 0,05% 
level) between CARs and the variable of interest, see table 12, exposure to the UK 
(Exp_UK), exposure to Germany (Exp_Germany) and trading intensity (trd_int), 
except for exposure to France (Exp_France). The results suggest a weak correlation 
between the independent variables as well. Such low correlation coefficients encourage 
the inclusion of those variables in the regression equation, Equation (3) and Equation 
(4). Also, the substantial correlation coefficient between trd_int and Exp_UK motivates 
testing the country level exposure in a separate equation, Equation (4). 
 
 
Table 12 Correlation Significance Matrix 
 
Variables CAR Exp_UK Exp_Germany Exp_France size DtoCap 
CAR 1.0000 
     
       
Exp_UK -0.8751* 1.0000 
    
p-value 0.0000 
     
Exp_Germany 0.5226* -0.3907* 1.0000 
   
p-value 0.0001 0.0042 
    
Exp_France 0.0682 -0.1894 -0.1801 1.0000 
  
p-value 0.6309 0.1786 0.2013 
   
size 0.0197 0.1280 0.0762 0.2811* 1.0000 
 
p-value 0.8900 0.3660 0.5914 0.0435 
  
DtoCap 0.5128* -0.4082* 0.5018* -0.0799 -0.0450 1.0000 
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p-value 0.0001 0.0029 0.0002 0.5774 0.7539 
 
REIT -0.1168 0.2030 -0.2412 0.0792 -0.1768 -0.0753 
p-value 0.4097 0.1489 0.0850 0.5766 0.2100 0.5996 
office 0.0672 -0.1605 -0.0362 -0.1493 -0.0880 -0.0427 
p-value 0.6359 0.2558 0.7989 0.2907 0.5348 0.7661 
rental -0.1449 0.2499 -0.1344 -0.1228 0.0505 -0.1477 
p-value 0.3056 0.0740 0.3423 0.3857 0.7223 0.3011 
trd_int -0.8688* 0.9594* -0.4058* -0.1538 0.1438 -0.3921* 
p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0028 0.2763 0.3092 0.0044 
log_GDP 0.2170 -0.3173* -0.1129 -0.1634 0.0180 0.0759 
p-value 0.1223 0.0219 0.4257 0.2472 0.8992 0.5966 
       
Varaibles REIT office rental trd_int log_GDP  
REIT 1.0000 
    
       
 
office -0.0157 1.0000 
   
 
p-value 0.9121 
    
 
rental 0.1271 0.0485 1.0000 
  
 
p-value 0.3692 0.7329 
   
 
trd_int 0.1814 -0.1407 0.1580 1.0000 
 
 
p-value 0.1981 0.3199 0.2634 
  
 
log_GDP -0.4496* 0.4495* -0.1732 -0.2909* 1.0000  
p-value 0.0008 0.0008 0.2194 0.0364 
 
 
* p<0.05       
 
On the other hand, after estimating Equation (3), the findings, see table 13, 
Specification 1, delineate a statistically significant negative coefficient for Exp_UK and 
Exp_France variables, where the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 0,05 % and 0,1% 
levels respectively. Additionally, the result shows a positive significant coefficient for 
Exp_Germany variable at the 0,1% significance level. The inclusion of the control 
variables leads to having an explanatory power, R-square, of  0,86. The control 
variables, size and REIT/tax status (REIT) maintain a significant coefficient at levels 
0,01% and 0,05% respectively. While the other control variables show no statistical 
significance. As the exposure was proxied by the direct investment in the UK market, 
the geographical allocation of the direct investments by each of the sampled companies 
is presented on maps combined by country-of-incorporation, see maps combined by 
country in appendix II, pp.1-9.  
 
Moreover, the company’s exposure to the specific cities of Frankfurt and Paris is 
examined using Equation (3) and substituting Exp_Germany by the exposure to 
Frankfurt (Exp_Frankfurt) and Exp_France by the exposure to Paris (Exp_France). The 
company is considered exposed to Frankfurt and/or Paris if it owns at least one property 
in the city, where the Exp_Frankfurt (Exp_Paris) variable is dummy variable that equals 
1 if the company owns property in Frankfurt (Paris) and 0 otherwise. The output, see 
table 13, Specification 2, present a significant negative coefficient for Exp_Paris at the 
0,05% level and an insignificant positive coefficient for the Exp_Frankfurt variable. In 
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specification (2) the exposure to the UK (Exp_UK) variable almost maintained identical 
significance, magnitude, and direction as in specification (1). Also, the size variable 
shows nearly the same effect as in specification (1). However, the debt to capital 
(DtoCap) control variable appears to be significant with a positive impact, and the 
REIT/Tax status (REIT) shows no statistically significant effect.  
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Table 13 Equation (3) Regression Output 
 
Specification (1)  Specification (2) 
Variables CAR 
 
Variables CAR 
Exp_UK -19.17*** 
 
Exp_UK -19.93***  
(1.635) 
  
(1.670) 
Exp_Germany 3.129* 
 
Exp_Frankfurt 1.624  
(1.848) 
  
(2.065) 
Exp_France -7.552* 
 
Exp_Paris -4.215**  
(4.016) 
  
(2.051) 
size 1.516*** 
 
size 1.730***  
(0.552) 
  
(0.567) 
DtoCap 8.744 
 
DtoCap 11.91**  
(5.909) 
  
(5.772) 
REIT 2.548** 
 
REIT 1.972  
(1.201) 
  
(1.208) 
office -1.773 
 
office -2.393  
(1.516) 
  
(1.595) 
rental 1.467 
 
rental 1.744  
(1.303) 
  
(1.347) 
Constant -10.34** 
 
Constant -12.02**  
(4.500) 
  
(4.614)      
Observations 51 
 
Observations 51 
R-squared 0.859 
 
R-squared 0.849 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
After scrutinizing Equation (3) to test the exposure hypothesis on the company level, 
Equation (4) is estimated to test the same hypothesis but on a country level, the level of 
exposure is proxied by the trading intensity between the company’s country-of-
incorporation and the UK. The results suggest a statically significant coefficient for the 
trade intensity (trd-int) variable, with a null hypothesis rejection at the 0,05% level. The 
GDP (the country’s Gross Domestic product in 2016-logged) as a control variable was 
insignificant in the Equation (4) ‘s specification, but the overall explanatory power of 
the Equation is as high as 0,78, see table14. It is worth mentioning that if companies 
incorporated in the UK are excluded, the significance of trading intensity coefficient 
and the overall Equation explanatory power diminishes, see Appendix II, p.10. 
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Table 14 Equation (4) Regression Output 
 
VARIABLES CAR 
    
trd_int -19.17*** 
 (1.605) 
log_GDP -1.758 
 (3.315) 
Constant 26.61 
 (35.35) 
  
Observations 52 
R-squared 0.756 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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7 Discussion 
 
The empirical results of the research adjacently follow the literature.  As the findings 
demonstrate, statistically significant Abnormal Returns (ARs) during the specified 
event window refers to European real estate companies’ reaction to Brexit when it is 
proxied by the referendum event. That reaction is most vivid on the results’ 
announcement day, 24th of June 2016, and the next trading day, however, it was 
interesting to observe almost no significant reaction on the referendum day itself, 23rd 
of June 2016. That could be attributed to the assumption that the market was not 
intrinsically shocked by the referendum event but rather by the results after it was 
announced. That attribution is braced by the fact that the referendum was long planned 
for, preceding its occurrence. It could be said that it sparked when Prime Minister David 
Cameron first pledged the referendum in January 2013 and ignited by the Royal Assent 
on December 2015 and the formal announcement of the “D” day on February 2016. 
Such period allowed the market to take precaution reactions along that timeline. 
Accordingly, no significant response has been observed. Alternatively, that 
insignificant reaction could further enhance the hypothesis that the referendum results 
were totally unanticipated, and the market bit on the Remain campaign to win (Van 
Reenen, 2016). 
 
In the same regard, the statistical significance of the Abnormal Returns (ARs) on the 
results announcement date and the next trading day sheds light on the answer of the 
first research question. Besides ratifying the existence of companies’ reaction to Brexit, 
significant ARs validates companies’ expectations for possible repercussions on the 
real estate sector and the existence of transmission channels, that would transmit a mere 
voting event to a macroeconomic disruption and an ultimate implication on the real 
estate return drives. In the light of the literature, a disturbance in the macroeconomic 
variables could directly affect the real estate companies' performance as they are 
intrinsically return drivers (Case, et al., 2000; Bełej & Cellmer, 2014; Delfim & Hoesli, 
2016; Oikarinen & Falkenbach, 2017) or indirectly through their impact on the equity 
market and accordingly, the listed real estate sector (Ling & Naranjo, 2002; Bond, et 
al., 2003). Hoesli & Oikarinen (2012) found that the listed real estate is more prone to 
equity market movements than to the direct real estate, on the short terms. Hence, Either 
directly or indirectly, implications were expected. Such consequences could be a 
change in market liquidity through the foreign direct investment channel, or a 
disturbance in the cost of debt through the interest rate channel. Also, it would transcend 
to an overall increase in market volatility and the subsequent risk due to uncertainty 
about the demand volumes. Such uncertainty could evolve, as well, from the effect of 
fluctuations in GDP, trading volumes or currency value on income levels, 
unemployment and/or purchase power. 
 
Moving to the exhibited variation in the magnitude and direction Abnormal Returns 
(ARs), both positive and negative statistically significant ARs, with variant magnitude, 
were observed. Such observations answer the second research question. It proves the 
existences of asymmetric reaction from the sampled real estate companies. That 
variation was also robust to the Cumulative Abnormal Returns calculations. The CARs 
show that 33 (19) companies, with different country-of-incorporation, experienced a 
positive (negative) reaction, respectively. Such observation further confirms the 
asymmetry characteristic of the reaction. The variation in the magnitude of the response 
was highly anticipated, giving the various attributes of the sampled companies, for 
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instance, the size, country of incorporation, investment focus, debt ratio...etc, let alone 
the heterogeneous characteristics of the underlying properties. Such characteristics 
prone the company to a different level of exposure to the source of the effect, having it 
to react in an idiosyncratic manner. Companies that are incorporated in the UK 
dominate the significant reaction observed generally and the negative reactions 
specifically while those incorporated in Germany dominates the positive reaction. The 
negative reaction was predicted due to the expected adverse effect of Brexit and its 
transmission channels on the UK market as suggested by the contemporaneous studies 
(HM-Treasury, 2016; OECD, 2016; Bruno, et al., 2016; Van Reenen, 2016; Dhingra, 
et al., 2017; Sampson, 2017; IMF, 2018) 
 
On the contrary, positive reactions witnessed are attributed to expected beneficial 
repercussion. The father of value investing, Benjamin Graham said: “The stock market 
is a voting mechanism in the short-term and weighing mechanism on the long-term" 
from that quote it could conceptualize that those companies that reacted positively 
implicitly bless Brexit. In principle, the positive reaction could an attempt to capitalize 
on the expected re-allocations. If Brexit materializes, investment institutions will likely 
re-allocate from the UK to a different EU center, such as Frankfurt or Paris, to preserve 
access to the Single (Schelkle, 2018). It is suggested that Germany and France are 
prominent alternatives. The findings conform to the German choice as the highest 
positive reaction was observed for the companies incorporated in Germany. In contrast 
to France as an alternative, our results suggested the several countries preceded France 
in the magnitude of the positive reaction. 
 
Building on the above discussion, the exhibited statistically significant coefficient of 
level-of exposure variables, on both company and country levels (Exposure to the UK, 
Germany, and France markets) confirms the research hypothesis. They highly express 
the ability of those variables in explaining the variance in the magnitude and direction 
of the company's reaction. In other words, those variables affect the characteristics of 
the companies’ reaction.  
 
The negative effect of the exposure to the UK market (Exp_UK) and the trading 
intensity (trd_int) suggests that companies with higher exposure to the UK-market 
experienced a more downward aggressive reaction. negative effects are developed, 
initially, from the fact that Brexit is estimated to have a truculent implication on the UK 
market accordingly, the market started to price-in those implications, pressuring the 
company’s value, and subsequently, the abnormal returns. For more elaboration, on the 
company level, owning property in the market that maintains the highest exposure to 
the negative consequences would unequivocally reflect on inferior property values.  
The source of the inferior value could evolve mainly from the adverse impact on the 
rent growth and demand levels or a higher cost of debt, all of which, significantly 
motivate adverse reaction. On the Country level, the macroeconomics are expected to 
play a significant role. Giving that Brexit will foremost negatively affect the trading 
costs and volumes, the markets that rely on exporting to the UK are accordingly 
expected to reflect the most considerable reaction. As trading is correlated to other 
prominent macroeconomic factors (e.g., GDP),  those market will undoubtedly carry 
more risks that would reflect on the asset values and correspondingly real estate. Such 
transmission channels would explain and justify the adverse reaction and its correlation 
with the exposure level. 
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In the same context, the negative coefficient on the variables of exposure to the French 
market, both to France in general (Exp_France), and Paris in specific (Exp_Paris) was 
an interesting observation. It was hypothesized that the French market could be a future 
winner from the re-allocations a resulted from Brexit. Based on that, exposure to such 
a market should have a positive effect on the exposed companies’ returns. However, 
the adverse reaction could be attributed either objectively to a sampling error. Or 
subjectively by quoting the father of value investing, Benjamin Graham when he said 
“The stock market is a voting mechanism in the short-term and weighing mechanism 
on the long-term" inducing that those companies envisage Brexit as a sign of further 
withdrawals from European Union thus reacted negatively, voting no to Brexit. 
 
On the other side, the positive coefficient on the exposure to the German market 
(Exp_Germany) braces the future winner hypothesis. It highlights that companies are 
trying to capitalize on the re-allocations that in turn would increase the demand and 
consequently, the prices. It was interesting to find no statistical significance on the 
exposure to Frankfurt specifically. However, that could be interpreted as the companies 
do not perceive Frankfurt as the main host to possible allocations, but several other 
cities are also competing. (Knight-Frank, 2018) in their recent study, show that Berlin 
and Munich share some the implemented re-allocation projects although their share is 
relatively small. 
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7.1. Conclusion 
 
After the leave campaign win in a historic referendum, United Kingdom (UK) was 
voted to divorce the European Union (EU) in an event titled Brexit. Since then, Brexit 
has been a prominent topic in most, if not all, the economic agendas. The event gravity 
does not only evolve from its unique character but also from the significant role that 
the UK exhibits in the world market economy in general and particularly in the EU’s. 
The event gains the attention of several studies trying to understand and anticipate the 
repercussions.  The main concern is for the UK to be deprived of the Single Market 
privileges either partially of completely. Those repercussions could be perceived as a 
chain reaction starting with a mere vote and ending with a possible substantial drag in 
the GDP and several other microeconomic factors.  
 
It is without a doubt that Brexit implications will transcend to impact the performance 
of various economic sectors, including the real estate market. The effect on the real 
state sector would be stemmed from its exposure and sensitivity to the possible 
transmission channels. From an economic perspective, those transmission channels are 
expected to be the very same channels that transmit a mere event to a potential downfall 
in the GDP, macroeconomic channels. Several studies have been conducted to 
investigate the sensitivity of the real estate market to the various macrocosmic 
indicators and especially the GDP (Ling & Naranjo, 1997; Case, et al., 2000; Lorenz & 
Trück, 2008; Bełej & Cellmer, 2014; Delfim & Hoesli, 2016; Oikarinen & Falkenbach, 
2017). Those studies suggest that the possible transmission channels would negatively 
affect the real estate market, giving the negative impact of Brexit on those transmission 
channels initially. It is difficult to estimate the precise extent of each of those channels 
as Brexit didn’t metalize yet, let alone the current debates and no consensus on the 
future of UK-EU ties. However, it is possible to record the market reaction, leaning on 
the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) proposed by Fama (1970). The EMH 
concludes that the market reacts to news that alters expectations, where the direction of 
the reaction follows the direction of the forecasted news’ impacts. Thus, the real estate 
market reaction was hypothesized to react to Brexit events that withhold unanticipated 
information with magnitude and direction equivalent to the level of exposure to the 
implication of this information.  
 
The empirical findings of the research disclose an asymmetric statistically significant 
reaction from the real estate companies toward Brexit. In empirical testing, the real 
estate market was proxied by its listed European sector and three markets that are 
assumed to reflect Brexit repercussions were tested; UK, Germany, and France. The 
reaction was investigated by detecting Abnormal Returns during the referendum event 
window in an event study framework. The results support the correlation between the 
degree of exposure to the transmission channels of Brexit and the magnitude of the 
reaction. It is, to a great extent, confirming the EMH and the sensitivity of the real estate 
market to possible changes in the macroeconomic indicators. As Brexit is expected to 
affect the macroeconomic performance of the UK market adversely, the degree of 
exposure to the UK was found to negatively affect the reaction, forcing it to the negative 
direction. 
 
On the contrary, as the German market is expected to capitalize on investment 
institution re-allocations a positive response was detected from companies that are 
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exposed to the German market. In the French market case, the results were unexpected. 
Although France is considered to be a significant candidate for the re-allocations 
accordingly similar results to the German market have been anticipated, the exposure 
for the French market during the referendum yielded a negative effect on the real estate 
companies. The findings lend credence to the possible implications of Brexit on the real 
estate idiosyncratic factors. For adverse repercussion, It could mainly increase costs of 
debt, decrease market liquidity and demotivate rental/value growth because of short-
term uncertainty, increased risk and tightened credit channels or a long term fall in 
GDP, FDI, employment rate and income levels. For positive impacts, substantial re-
allocation could initiate a shock in demand, and as the real estate cycle is relatively long 
giving the time of constructions, the supply would be stressed leading to a possible 
increase in real estate market values, prices and accordingly its stock returns. 
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7.2. Evaluation of research 
 
It could be fairly adjudged that there is no research without limitations, and this research 
is no exception. Limitation of the study could arise initially from the selected empirical 
framework, event study. The application of an event study methodology for such an 
enormous event has been widely criticized (Binder, 1985b; MacKinlay, 1997). It is 
induced that the cardinal point in assessing the validity of the application of that 
framework heavily leans on the precise selection of the event date, the date at which 
the market actually perceived the information released as unanticipated and accordingly 
reacts. Given the vastness of the event and the involvement of many entities, it is 
difficult to define an exact date at which the market is shocked and accordingly reacted. 
It could be allegedly said that the event so far spans 5 years starting in 2015 when 
British Prime Minister David Cameron pledged the referendum. Since then, many 
chronological events followed at which the market could have reacted and already 
priced in Brexit repercussions. 
 
Consequently, the witnessed reaction around any of Brexit events could be only a 
fraction of the real response. Or else the reaction could be contaminated by the effect 
of other confounding events, considering the broadness of Brexit and the mount of 
traded information every day. Hence, it is difficult to separate the impact and decide if 
the reaction was exclusively due to a Brexit related event. The research sought to 
alleviate these limitations by carefully selecting the referendum relying on the nearly 
fifty-fifty results as evidence of a market shock.  However, those limitations hinder the 
research ability to validate the estimated magnitude of the reaction and merely employ 
it to witness the reaction and its direction. 
 
Besides, it was difficult to assess the overall magnitude due to the immensity of Brexit, 
its unique characteristic, and the vastness of possible consequences. Accordingly, any 
total extent to be estimated is highly expected to be volatile at least until the UK 
officially exits the EU and puts forward the nature of the withdrawal agreement. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the reaction should be equivalent to the size of the 
implications (Fama, 1970), assuming no over or under-reaction. And as the total extent 
is hard to foresee, it was challenging to assess their magnitude. Even with the current 
estimations about the overall fall in GDP still, those estimations are not reliable enough 
as most of them depend on reversal effect and a lot of the consequences could take 
different turns, considering time change.  
  
Another source of limitation is the sample weight, which could shadow the research 
ability to generalize its results. The study was carried on only 52 companies out of 92 
companies constituted the FTSE EPRA Nareit Index in 2016 and out of 392 possible 
European listed real estate company ( sourced from Eikon DataStream). The limitation 
in including more companies has two main reasons. Limited accurate time-series data 
available on the stock of those companies and the condition instituted by the research 
that a company to be included has to be listed at least one year before the event date. In 
the same regard, it could be claimed that the sample is dominated by UK-incorporated 
companies 19 companies (36.5%) out of the 52. Such domination could bias the results 
toward the idiosyncratic reaction of those companies. That claim was vivid during the 
examination, as by excluding the UK-incorporated-companies, the exposure to the UK 
(trade intensity) variable in Equation (4) become statistically insignificant which mean 
the exposure fails to explain the variance in the reaction. In contrast, it could be argued 
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that the sample maintained the same weight (36%) of UK companies in the FTSE EPRA 
Nareit index in 2016.  
 
In the same context, the selection of the securitized real estate companies to proxy the 
real estate companies reaction hinders the examination of the non-listed real estate 
companies’ reaction. non-listed real estate companies’ reaction could differ in the short 
term, see Hoesli & Oikarinen (2012) and Hoesli & Oikarinen (2016). Moreover, the 
selection of direct investment (property ownership) as a proxy for exposure to a specific 
market, weakened the study ability to examine the correlation between the reaction and 
the indirect investment. Especially that several numbers of our sampled companies have 
no direct investments in the UK market.  
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7.3. Future research 
 
It could be claimed that the study widely opens the doors for future research. It would 
be of primary interest to follow the Brexit events as they evolve, detecting further real 
estate market reaction — for instance, the election of the new prime in July 2019. 
Predominantly, after October 2019 a further investigation should look for a possible 
reversal reaction if a withdrawal agreement is to be reached between UK-EU to 
alleviate the worst-case scenario. Detecting such a reversal reaction could 
fundamentally brace the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Fama, 1970). Comparing the 
magnitude of the reversal reaction to the initial one should give an idea about how the 
market perceived the new agreement. It will show if the market sees the deal as a 
complete hedge against negative consequence, through an equal reversed magnitude. 
Or just a workaround to alleviate the implications (partially reversed magnitude). More 
interestingly, if an agreement was not concluded and no market reaction is detected. It 
could be an opportunity for an initial assessment of an overall magnitude of Brexit on 
real estate sector on the short-term. In that context, the sample size should be expanded 
to reflect the average true extent. 
 
Another interesting elaboration would be testing the immigration as a transmission 
channel that conveys Brexit repercussions to the real estate market performance. It 
could examine the countries that maintain high labor exportation to the UK has been 
negatively affected by Brexit, considering the possible reallocation that would lead to 
employment-restructuring and possible job losses. The findings of those 
aforementioned potential studies could further assets in understanding the impact of 
Brexit on the real estate market. Also, it would further strengthen the academic 
knowledge about the correlation between macroeconomic changes and the real estate 
market performance.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
Equation (1) Regression Output – 120 Trading-days         
Country of 
Incorporation 
Company name 
Pre-
event (t 
=-1) 
SE 
Event (t = 
0) 
SE 
Post-event 
(t =1) 
SE 
Post-
event (t 
=2) 
SE Constant SE Obs. 
R-
squared 
Germany Adler Real Estate AG -0.142 (1.945) 5.542** (2.247) 2.930 (2.014) -2.105 (1.970) -0.172 (0.176) 124 0.182 
Switzerland Allreal Holding AG -0.496 (0.567) 2.115*** (0.632) 0.170 (0.582) 0.121 (0.572) 0.0430 (0.0514) 124 0.439 
Belgium Aedifica SA -0.187 (1.033) 5.746*** (1.181) 0.541 (1.067) 0.875 (1.045) 0.0830 (0.0937) 124 0.416 
Germany alstria office REIT AG 0.103 (0.767) 6.451*** (0.893) 1.173 (0.796) -0.398 (0.778) -0.00710 (0.0696) 124 0.663 
United Kingdom Tritax Big Box Reit PLC 0.782 (0.672) -2.820*** (0.770) -7.472*** (0.694) 6.788*** (0.680) 0.0227 (0.0609) 124 0.773 
Belgium Befimmo SA 0.0434 (0.809) 3.872*** (0.919) 0.885 (0.834) -0.385 (0.819) 0.0473 (0.0734) 124 0.632 
United Kingdom British Land Company PLC -0.107 (0.807) -9.817*** (0.940) -5.188*** (0.838) 1.804** (0.819) -0.0198 (0.0732) 124 0.902 
United Kingdom Big Yellow Group PLC -0.282 (1.385) -3.677** (1.600) -2.595* (1.434) 0.662 (1.403) 0.0410 (0.126) 124 0.538 
Austria CA Immobilien Anlagen AG 0.708 (1.036) 5.393*** (1.172) 0.429 (1.067) -1.727* (1.047) -0.0857 (0.0940) 124 0.564 
United Kingdom Capital & Counties 
Properties PLC 
0.553 (1.304) -6.856*** (1.511) -6.350*** (1.351) 2.682** (1.321) -0.180 (0.118) 124 0.779 
Belgium Cofinimmo SA 0.216 (0.639) 2.920*** (0.726) 1.777*** (0.659) -0.202 (0.647) 0.0666 (0.0580) 124 0.716 
France Covivio SA -0.229 (0.677) 5.069*** (0.770) 2.173*** (0.698) -0.463 (0.685) 0.0138 (0.0614) 124 0.818 
Germany Deutsche Euroshop AG -0.0576 (0.720) 3.971*** (0.832) 1.088 (0.745) 0.0370 (0.729) 0.0295 (0.0653) 124 0.712 
Germany DIC Asset AG -0.262 (1.068) 8.098*** (1.245) 2.604** (1.109) -1.027 (1.083) -0.103 (0.0968) 124 0.586 
United Kingdom Daejan Holdings PLC 1.319 (1.162) -3.296** (1.354) -13.78*** (1.206) 12.54*** (1.178) -0.125 (0.105) 124 0.750 
United Kingdom Derwent London PLC -0.289 (0.859) -15.18*** (0.991) -7.964*** (0.889) 3.308*** (0.870) -0.0613 (0.0779) 124 0.918 
Germany Deutsche Wohnen SE -0.388 (0.967) 8.177*** (1.111) 5.671*** (1.000) -0.801 (0.979) 0.111 (0.0877) 124 0.609 
Norway Entra ASA -1.023 (1.245) 0.881 (1.397) 0.140 (1.280) 1.338 (1.258) 0.111 (0.113) 124 0.242 
France Gecina SA 0.152 (0.763) 1.782** (0.872) -0.604 (0.788) 1.323* (0.772) 0.115* (0.0692) 124 0.743 
United Kingdom Grainger PLC 1.543 (1.071) -8.157*** (1.244) -4.632*** (1.111) 1.804* (1.086) 0.00185 (0.0972) 124 0.759 
Germany Hamborner Reit AG 0.293 (1.016) 4.919*** (1.180) 1.737* (1.053) -0.153 (1.029) 0.0277 (0.0921) 124 0.450 
United Kingdom Helical PLC 2.005 (1.354) -12.31*** (1.568) -9.568*** (1.403) -3.096** (1.372) -0.141 (0.123) 124 0.745 
United Kingdom Hammerson PLC 0.305 (0.703) -4.557*** (0.823) -4.398*** (0.731) 3.092*** (0.713) -0.0210 (0.0638) 124 0.881 
United Kingdom Hansteen Holdings PLC 0.647 (1.001) -1.213 (1.160) -4.374*** (1.038) 0.990 (1.015) -0.0513 (0.0908) 124 0.516 
Italy Immobiliare Grande 
Distribuzione SIIQ SpA 
-1.219 (1.915) 5.954*** (2.188) 1.120 (1.977) -3.460* (1.938) -0.0680 (0.174) 124 0.508 
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United Kingdom Intu Properties PLC 0.426 (0.925) -3.365*** (1.077) -3.014*** (0.960) 1.007 (0.938) 0.00369 (0.0839) 124 0.813 
United Kingdom Land Securities Group PLC -0.301 (0.864) -5.931*** (1.001) -4.632*** (0.895) 5.515*** (0.875) 0.00612 (0.0783) 124 0.874 
Germany LEG Immobilien AG -1.188 (1.008) 6.684*** (1.158) 3.027*** (1.042) -0.486 (1.021) 0.0674 (0.0914) 124 0.603 
United Kingdom Londonmetric Property PLC 0.730 (0.770) -3.415*** (0.891) -7.700*** (0.798) 4.514*** (0.781) -0.00537 (0.0699) 124 0.790 
Belgium Leasinvest Real Estate SCA 0.0698 (1.525) 4.314** (1.738) 2.674* (1.574) -5.810*** (1.543) 0.150 (0.138) 124 0.180 
France Mercialys SA -0.278 (0.912) 1.772* (1.042) 1.770* (0.941) 0.819 (0.923) 0.0511 (0.0827) 124 0.578 
Switzerland Mobimo Holding AG 0.324 (0.616) 2.918*** (0.681) 1.594** (0.631) -0.724 (0.622) 0.00736 (0.0560) 124 0.516 
Norway Norwegian Property ASA -0.125 (1.886) 0.497 (2.083) 1.268 (1.931) 2.040 (1.903) -0.0949 (0.171) 124 0.096 
Netherlands NSI NV -1.012 (1.080) 5.376*** (1.213) -2.215** (1.110) 0.713 (1.091) -0.0292 (0.0980) 124 0.420 
United Kingdom Primary Health Properties 
PLC 
1.760* (1.033) 0.485 (1.206) -1.158 (1.072) 0.00259 (1.047) 0.00252 (0.0936) 124 0.244 
Belgium Intervest Offices & 
Warehouses NV 
1.794* (0.968) 1.292 (1.104) -1.105 (0.999) 0.802 (0.980) 0.0658 (0.0879) 124 0.312 
Switzerland PSP Swiss Property AG 0.824 (0.570) 6.121*** (0.643) -0.0747 (0.587) -0.200 (0.576) 0.0635 (0.0517) 124 0.705 
United Kingdom Safestore Holdings PLC 0.173 (1.343) -9.601*** (1.568) -6.173*** (1.395) 0.738 (1.362) 0.101 (0.122) 124 0.632 
United Kingdom SEGRO PLC 0.0549 (0.711) -4.103*** (0.821) -2.960*** (0.736) 4.765*** (0.720) 0.0296 (0.0645) 124 0.854 
United Kingdom Shaftesbury PLC 0.161 (0.716) -1.158 (0.838) -4.624*** (0.744) 0.991 (0.726) 0.0288 (0.0649) 124 0.760 
Netherlands Eurocommercial Properties 
NV 
-0.895 (0.868) 1.824* (0.987) 1.260 (0.895) 0.683 (0.878) -0.0222 (0.0788) 124 0.693 
Switzerland Swiss Prime Site AG -0.307 (0.603) 5.183*** (0.684) 2.005*** (0.622) -0.457 (0.610) 0.105* (0.0547) 124 0.660 
Germany TAG Immobilien AG 0.242 (1.248) 5.392*** (1.444) 2.780** (1.293) -0.0602 (1.264) 0.0451 (0.113) 124 0.513 
Germany TLG Immobilien AG -1.127 (1.024) 5.511*** (1.191) 0.0833 (1.062) -0.274 (1.038) 0.112 (0.0929) 124 0.543 
Netherlands WFD Unibail Rodamco NV 0.418 (0.665) 2.878*** (0.770) 2.427*** (0.689) -1.723** (0.674) 0.0208 (0.0603) 124 0.817 
United Kingdom Unite Group PLC 0.141 (0.992) 0.669 (1.142) -4.009*** (1.026) 0.533 (1.004) -0.0183 (0.0900) 124 0.656 
Netherlands Vastned Retail NV -0.941 (0.960) 3.157*** (1.091) 1.796* (0.990) -0.928 (0.971) -0.0724 (0.0871) 124 0.614 
Germany Vonovia SE -1.490 (0.907) 9.433*** (1.055) 7.484*** (0.941) -3.841*** (0.919) 0.0954 (0.0822) 124 0.727 
Belgium Warehouses de Pauw Comm 
VA 
-0.0920 (1.044) 4.703*** (1.175) 3.912*** (1.073) -0.942 (1.055) 0.0403 (0.0947) 124 0.603 
Netherlands Wereldhave NV 0.539 (0.785) 1.694* (0.901) 0.569 (0.811) -1.027 (0.794) -0.146** (0.0712) 124 0.736 
Belgium Wereldhave Belgium Comm 
VA 
-0.737 (1.427) 2.094 (1.634) 2.333 (1.474) 0.463 (1.444) 0.0370 (0.129) 124 0.257 
United Kingdom Workspace Group PLC 2.680* (1.493) -6.845*** (1.736) -10.55*** (1.549) 1.369 (1.514) -0.128 (0.135) 124 0.709 
Standard errors in parentheses            
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1            
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Equation (1) Regression Output – 80 Trading-days   
Country of 
Incorporation 
Company name 
Pre-
event (t 
=-1) 
SE 
Event (t = 
0) 
SE 
Post-
event (t 
=1) 
SE 
Post-
event (t 
=2) 
SE Constant SE Obs. 
R-
squared 
Germany Adler Real Estate AG 0.129 (1.710) 2.139 (2.142) 1.076 (1.823) -1.250 (1.746) 0.0405 (0.190) 84 0.083 
Switzerland Allreal Holding AG -0.391 (0.462) 1.564*** (0.529) -0.121 (0.479) 0.324 (0.468) 0.0333 (0.0514) 84 0.442 
Belgium Aedifica SA -0.299 (0.734) 5.763*** (0.909) 0.697 (0.780) 0.816 (0.749) 0.0725 (0.0816) 84 0.558 
Germany alstria office REIT AG 0.167 (0.755) 6.183*** (0.968) 1.030 (0.811) -0.287 (0.773) -0.0195 (0.0839) 84 0.561 
United Kingdom Tritax Big Box Reit PLC 0.646 (0.655) -1.792** (0.845) -6.852*** (0.706) 6.499*** (0.672) -0.0399 (0.0729) 84 0.836 
Belgium Befimmo SA 0.199 (0.719) 2.242** (0.910) 0.0880 (0.769) 0.0852 (0.735) 0.0825 (0.0799) 84 0.601 
United Kingdom British Land Company PLC -0.210 (0.698) -9.045*** (0.894) -4.888*** (0.750) 1.522** (0.715) 0.0248 (0.0776) 84 0.940 
United Kingdom Big Yellow Group PLC -0.345 (1.300) -3.780** (1.678) -2.650* (1.400) 0.617 (1.332) 0.0920 (0.145) 84 0.603 
Austria CA Immobilien Anlagen 
AG 
0.684 (1.045) 6.149*** (1.232) 0.749 (1.093) -1.916* (1.061) -0.106 (0.116) 84 0.483 
United Kingdom Capital & Counties 
Properties PLC 
-
0.00914 
(1.240) -4.044** (1.635) -4.989*** (1.346) 1.573 (1.274) -0.0467 (0.138) 84 0.838 
Belgium Cofinimmo SA 0.445 (0.409) 1.601*** (0.511) 1.184*** (0.436) 0.301 (0.418) 0.00101 (0.0455) 84 0.806 
France Covivio SA -0.0919 (0.634) 4.381*** (0.787) 1.773*** (0.674) -0.218 (0.647) 0.0180 (0.0705) 84 0.763 
Germany Deutsche Euroshop AG 0.139 (0.720) 3.308*** (0.905) 0.677 (0.768) 0.327 (0.736) 0.00724 (0.0800) 84 0.625 
Germany DIC Asset AG -0.184 (0.888) 7.300*** (1.162) 2.123** (0.961) -0.829 (0.912) -0.0383 (0.0987) 84 0.528 
United Kingdom Daejan Holdings PLC 1.343 (1.040) -4.196*** (1.357) -14.23*** (1.124) 12.74*** (1.067) -0.0571 (0.116) 84 0.842 
United Kingdom Derwent London PLC -0.411 (0.793) -14.65*** (1.046) -7.798*** (0.861) 3.050*** (0.815) 0.0225 (0.0881) 84 0.946 
Germany Deutsche Wohnen SE -0.125 (0.894) 7.507*** (1.137) 5.135*** (0.958) -0.490 (0.915) 0.114 (0.0994) 84 0.520 
Norway Entra ASA -0.657 (1.223) -1.510 (1.405) -1.060 (1.269) 2.153* (1.238) 0.0920 (0.136) 84 0.144 
France Gecina SA 0.471 (0.626) 0.300 (0.802) -1.416** (0.673) 1.894*** (0.641) 0.0812 (0.0696) 84 0.759 
United Kingdom Grainger PLC 1.481* (0.800) -7.796*** (1.060) -4.430*** (0.870) 1.682** (0.823) -0.00255 (0.0890) 84 0.880 
Germany Hamborner Reit AG 0.379 (0.823) 4.519*** (1.068) 1.560* (0.889) 0.0170 (0.844) -0.00410 (0.0915) 84 0.455 
United Kingdom Helical PLC 1.808 (1.259) -11.07*** (1.597) -9.016*** (1.348) -3.554*** (1.287) -0.0875 (0.140) 84 0.822 
United Kingdom Hammerson PLC 0.240 (0.617) -3.787*** (0.793) -4.045*** (0.664) 2.869*** (0.632) -0.0301 (0.0686) 84 0.922 
United Kingdom Hansteen Holdings PLC 0.572 (0.954) -0.731 (1.220) -4.139*** (1.025) 0.822 (0.977) -0.0427 (0.106) 84 0.580 
Italy Immobiliare Grande 
Distribuzione SIIQ SpA 
-0.732 (1.479) 3.754** (1.894) -0.249 (1.590) -2.662* (1.515) -0.0358 (0.164) 84 0.473 
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United Kingdom Intu Properties PLC 0.258 (0.975) -1.707 (1.294) -2.257** (1.061) 0.499 (1.002) 0.00281 (0.108) 84 0.823 
United Kingdom Land Securities Group PLC -0.442 (0.816) -4.702*** (1.028) -4.160*** (0.872) 5.088*** (0.834) 0.0648 (0.0907) 84 0.907 
Germany LEG Immobilien AG -0.908 (0.859) 5.810*** (1.091) 2.487*** (0.920) -0.0821 (0.879) 0.0234 (0.0955) 84 0.551 
United Kingdom Londonmetric Property 
PLC 
0.621 (0.789) -2.089** (0.995) -7.054*** (0.843) 4.147*** (0.807) -0.0434 (0.0878) 84 0.832 
Belgium Leasinvest Real Estate SCA -0.210 (1.581) 5.959*** (1.971) 3.545** (1.684) -6.381*** (1.614) 0.156 (0.176) 84 0.198 
France Mercialys SA 0.0164 (0.800) 1.800* (1.014) 1.767** (0.857) 1.101 (0.818) -0.130 (0.0889) 84 0.611 
Switzerland Mobimo Holding AG 0.444 (0.582) 2.159*** (0.689) 1.222** (0.609) -0.458 (0.590) -0.00570 (0.0647) 84 0.449 
Norway Norwegian Property ASA -0.217 (1.602) -0.551 (1.871) 0.799 (1.671) 2.168 (1.625) 0.0264 (0.178) 84 0.100 
Netherlands NSI NV -0.964 (1.034) 5.820*** (1.275) -2.013* (1.097) 0.669 (1.054) -0.0873 (0.115) 84 0.421 
United Kingdom Primary Health Properties 
PLC 
1.905** (0.922) -0.457 (1.183) -1.604 (0.991) 0.335 (0.944) -0.0205 (0.102) 84 0.273 
Belgium Intervest Offices & 
Warehouses NV 
2.030** (0.934) -0.408 (1.185) -2.020** (1.001) 1.334 (0.956) 0.101 (0.104) 84 0.308 
Switzerland PSP Swiss Property AG 0.886 (0.599) 5.623*** (0.735) -0.314 (0.634) -0.0407 (0.610) 0.0628 (0.0666) 84 0.602 
United Kingdom Safestore Holdings PLC -0.103 (1.373) -8.500*** (1.815) -5.578*** (1.491) 0.272 (1.411) 0.155 (0.153) 84 0.692 
United Kingdom SEGRO PLC 0.00519 (0.709) -3.075*** (0.913) -2.472*** (0.763) 4.511*** (0.726) -0.0157 (0.0788) 84 0.879 
United Kingdom Shaftesbury PLC 0.284 (0.594) -1.945** (0.778) -5.109*** (0.643) 1.227** (0.610) 0.0707 (0.0660) 84 0.834 
Netherlands Eurocommercial Properties 
NV 
-0.622 (0.782) 0.622 (0.949) 0.640 (0.826) 1.175 (0.796) -0.0793 (0.0870) 84 0.672 
Switzerland Swiss Prime Site AG -0.112 (0.567) 4.806*** (0.701) 1.787*** (0.602) -0.202 (0.578) 0.0299 (0.0630) 84 0.540 
Germany TAG Immobilien AG 0.530 (1.106) 3.484** (1.420) 1.861 (1.189) 0.601 (1.133) 0.0113 (0.123) 84 0.398 
Germany TLG Immobilien AG -1.054 (0.951) 4.966*** (1.218) -0.125 (1.021) -0.0728 (0.974) 0.0783 (0.106) 84 0.495 
Netherlands WFD Unibail Rodamco NV 0.383 (0.539) 3.649*** (0.689) 2.873*** (0.579) -1.881*** (0.552) -0.0583 (0.0599) 84 0.853 
United Kingdom Unite Group PLC 0.261 (0.906) 0.546 (1.157) -4.128*** (0.972) 0.654 (0.927) -0.0523 (0.101) 84 0.705 
Netherlands Vastned Retail NV -0.988 (0.810) 2.824*** (1.030) 1.790** (0.868) -0.850 (0.829) -0.101 (0.0900) 84 0.626 
Germany Vonovia SE -1.133 (0.814) 8.177*** (1.043) 6.766*** (0.874) -3.283*** (0.834) 0.0288 (0.0905) 84 0.606 
Belgium Warehouses de Pauw 
Comm VA 
0.292 (0.844) 2.612*** (0.996) 2.789*** (0.883) -0.193 (0.856) 0.0235 (0.0938) 84 0.570 
Netherlands Wereldhave NV 0.471 (0.733) 2.119** (0.948) 0.881 (0.791) -1.136 (0.752) -0.195** (0.0815) 84 0.752 
Belgium Wereldhave Belgium 
Comm VA 
-0.889 (1.335) 2.043 (1.665) 2.442* (1.422) 0.373 (1.363) 0.0647 (0.148) 84 0.277 
United Kingdom Workspace Group PLC 2.289* (1.349) -5.111*** (1.754) -9.795*** (1.457) 0.609 (1.384) 0.0271 (0.150) 84 0.806 
Standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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Equation (1) Regression Output – FTSE Developed Europe Index        
Country of 
Incorporation 
Company name 
Pre-
event 
(t =-1) 
SE 
Event (t = 
0) 
SE 
Post-event 
(t =1) 
SE 
Post-
event (t 
=2) 
SE Constant SE Obs. 
R-
squared 
Germany Adler Real Estate AG -0.107 (1.948) 5.649** (2.225) 3.012 (2.015) -2.173 (1.972) -0.176 (0.177) 124 0.181 
Switzerland Allreal Holding AG -0.470 (0.567) 2.045*** (0.625) 0.182 (0.581) 0.103 (0.572) 0.0419 (0.0514) 124 0.441 
Belgium Aedifica SA -0.131 (1.033) 5.557*** (1.167) 0.573 (1.065) 0.831 (1.044) 0.0814 (0.0936) 124 0.417 
Germany alstria office REIT AG 0.106 (0.769) 6.365*** (0.884) 1.169 (0.796) -0.399 (0.778) -0.00630 (0.0696) 124 0.664 
United Kingdom Tritax Big Box Reit PLC 0.800 (0.672) -2.905*** (0.763) -7.462*** (0.694) 6.774*** (0.680) 0.0225 (0.0609) 124 0.773 
Belgium Befimmo SA 0.0470 (0.813) 3.771*** (0.914) 0.896 (0.838) -0.398 (0.822) 0.0483 (0.0737) 124 0.629 
United Kingdom British Land Company PLC -0.104 (0.809) -9.753*** (0.930) -5.177*** (0.838) 1.797** (0.819) -0.0208 (0.0732) 124 0.903 
United Kingdom Big Yellow Group PLC -0.300 (1.387) -3.654** (1.585) -2.587* (1.435) 0.660 (1.404) 0.0421 (0.126) 124 0.537 
Austria CA Immobilien Anlagen AG 0.791 (1.043) 4.944*** (1.171) 0.440 (1.074) -1.767* (1.054) -0.0876 (0.0945) 124 0.560 
United Kingdom Capital & Counties Properties PLC 0.494 (1.303) -6.909*** (1.493) -6.372*** (1.348) 2.709** (1.319) -0.175 (0.118) 124 0.780 
Belgium Cofinimmo SA 0.275 (0.639) 2.734*** (0.718) 1.803*** (0.658) -0.242 (0.646) 0.0646 (0.0580) 124 0.717 
France Covivio SA -0.226 (0.678) 5.063*** (0.762) 2.177*** (0.698) -0.467 (0.685) 0.0136 (0.0615) 124 0.818 
Germany Deutsche Euroshop AG -
0.0831 (0.720) 3.961*** (0.823) 1.068 (0.745) 0.0576 (0.729) 0.0314 (0.0652) 124 0.713 
Germany DIC Asset AG -0.329 (1.064) 8.154*** (1.227) 2.579** (1.103) -0.992 (1.078) -0.0993 (0.0964) 124 0.590 
United Kingdom Daejan Holdings PLC 1.360 (1.163) -3.257** (1.339) -13.74*** (1.206) 12.51*** (1.178) -0.129 (0.105) 124 0.750 
United Kingdom Derwent London PLC -0.294 (0.860) -15.09*** (0.981) -7.960*** (0.889) 3.309*** (0.870) -0.0620 (0.0779) 124 0.918 
Germany Deutsche Wohnen SE -0.316 (0.966) 8.279*** (1.096) 5.725*** (0.997) -0.854 (0.977) 0.105 (0.0875) 124 0.611 
Norway Entra ASA -1.044 (1.247) 1.156 (1.388) 0.169 (1.281) 1.328 (1.258) 0.110 (0.113) 124 0.246 
France Gecina SA 0.143 (0.764) 1.794** (0.864) -0.610 (0.788) 1.330* (0.772) 0.115* (0.0692) 124 0.743 
United Kingdom Grainger PLC 1.657 (1.078) -8.659*** (1.237) -4.604*** (1.116) 1.739 (1.091) -1.96e-05 (0.0976) 124 0.757 
Germany Hamborner Reit AG 0.272 (1.019) 4.818*** (1.170) 1.734 (1.056) -0.150 (1.032) 0.0305 (0.0924) 124 0.448 
United Kingdom Helical PLC 2.045 (1.356) -12.41*** (1.551) -9.564*** (1.403) -3.111** (1.373) -0.143 (0.123) 124 0.745 
United Kingdom Hammerson PLC 0.296 (0.704) -4.593*** (0.814) -4.394*** (0.731) 3.089*** (0.714) -0.0199 (0.0638) 124 0.881 
United Kingdom Hansteen Holdings PLC 0.646 (1.003) -1.153 (1.149) -4.360*** (1.038) 0.982 (1.015) -0.0519 (0.0908) 124 0.516 
Italy Immobiliare Grande Distribuzione 
SIIQ SpA -1.417 (1.917) 6.567*** (2.165) 1.023 (1.977) -3.320* (1.938) -0.0614 (0.174) 124 0.507 
United Kingdom Intu Properties PLC 0.358 (0.922) -3.280*** (1.059) -3.032*** (0.955) 1.038 (0.933) 0.00752 (0.0835) 124 0.815 
United Kingdom Land Securities Group PLC -0.289 (0.864) -5.905*** (0.990) -4.609*** (0.895) 5.495*** (0.875) 0.00489 (0.0783) 124 0.874 
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Germany LEG Immobilien AG -1.081 (0.995) 6.664*** (1.132) 3.089*** (1.028) -0.557 (1.007) 0.0598 (0.0902) 124 0.614 
United Kingdom Londonmetric Property PLC 0.783 (0.772) -3.611*** (0.884) -7.681*** (0.799) 4.480*** (0.782) -0.00669 (0.0700) 124 0.789 
Belgium Leasinvest Real Estate SCA 
0.162 (1.522) 4.164** (1.715) 2.710* (1.569) 
-
5.863*** (1.539) 0.146 (0.138) 124 0.187 
France Mercialys SA -0.303 (0.913) 1.798* (1.033) 1.767* (0.942) 0.827 (0.924) 0.0525 (0.0828) 124 0.577 
Switzerland Mobimo Holding AG 0.411 (0.611) 2.610*** (0.670) 1.622*** (0.625) -0.775 (0.616) 0.00452 (0.0554) 124 0.525 
Norway Norwegian Property ASA -
0.0245 (1.893) 0.0438 (2.071) 1.294 (1.935) 1.986 (1.907) -0.0983 (0.172) 124 0.092 
Netherlands NSI NV -1.002 (1.081) 5.505*** (1.203) -2.218** (1.110) 0.720 (1.091) -0.0315 (0.0980) 124 0.422 
United Kingdom Primary Health Properties PLC 1.751* (1.034) 0.371 (1.194) -1.161 (1.073) 0.00256 (1.048) 0.00467 (0.0936) 124 0.245 
Belgium Intervest Offices & Warehouses 
NV 1.826* (0.967) 1.284 (1.091) -1.089 (0.996) 0.782 (0.977) 0.0636 (0.0876) 124 0.317 
Switzerland PSP Swiss Property AG 0.853 (0.573) 5.975*** (0.640) -0.0763 (0.589) -0.210 (0.579) 0.0630 (0.0519) 124 0.703 
United Kingdom Safestore Holdings PLC 0.0979 (1.346) -9.323*** (1.553) -6.202*** (1.396) 0.788 (1.364) 0.103 (0.122) 124 0.631 
United Kingdom SEGRO PLC 0.116 (0.710) -4.281*** (0.810) -2.916*** (0.734) 4.710*** (0.718) 0.0275 (0.0643) 124 0.855 
United Kingdom Shaftesbury PLC 0.198 (0.718) -1.323 (0.830) -4.623*** (0.746) 0.976 (0.728) 0.0282 (0.0651) 124 0.759 
Netherlands Eurocommercial Properties NV -0.882 (0.872) 1.758* (0.980) 1.283 (0.898) 0.660 (0.881) -0.0223 (0.0790) 124 0.692 
Switzerland Swiss Prime Site AG -0.298 (0.604) 5.136*** (0.679) 2.007*** (0.622) -0.462 (0.611) 0.105* (0.0548) 124 0.659 
Germany TAG Immobilien AG 0.205 (1.250) 5.369*** (1.430) 2.750** (1.293) -0.0298 (1.265) 0.0481 (0.113) 124 0.513 
Germany TLG Immobilien AG -1.081 (1.025) 5.295*** (1.179) 0.0890 (1.062) -0.296 (1.039) 0.111 (0.0929) 124 0.542 
Netherlands WFD Unibail Rodamco NV 0.373 (0.665) 2.885*** (0.761) 2.414*** (0.688) -1.703** (0.673) 0.0239 (0.0603) 124 0.817 
United Kingdom Unite Group PLC 0.182 (0.990) 0.570 (1.128) -3.998*** (1.023) 0.512 (1.002) -0.0200 (0.0897) 124 0.658 
Netherlands Vastned Retail NV -0.924 (0.963) 3.063*** (1.084) 1.816* (0.992) -0.951 (0.973) -0.0724 (0.0873) 124 0.613 
Germany Vonovia SE 
-1.417 (0.902) 9.399*** (1.036) 7.513*** (0.935) 
-
3.880*** (0.914) 0.0904 (0.0817) 124 0.731 
Belgium Warehouses de Pauw Comm VA -
0.0334 (1.036) 4.583*** (1.158) 3.961*** (1.065) -0.997 (1.046) 0.0376 (0.0939) 124 0.609 
Netherlands Wereldhave NV 0.546 (0.786) 1.652* (0.892) 0.567 (0.811) -1.028 (0.795) -0.146** (0.0712) 124 0.736 
Belgium Wereldhave Belgium Comm VA -0.662 (1.424) 1.944 (1.612) 2.384 (1.469) 0.402 (1.440) 0.0336 (0.129) 124 0.262 
United Kingdom Workspace Group PLC 2.754* (1.493) -7.089*** (1.716) -10.52*** (1.547) 1.316 (1.513) -0.131 (0.135) 124 0.710 
Standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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Equation (1) Regression Output – Local Index (Germany – DAX index) 
 
Country of 
Incorporation 
Company name 
Pre-
event (t 
=-1) 
SE 
Event (t 
= 0) 
SE 
Post-
event (t 
=1) 
SE 
Post-event 
(t =2) 
SE Constant SE Obs. 
R-
squared 
Germany Adler Real Estate AG -0.329 (1.944) 5.452** (2.307) 2.827 (2.040) -2.048 (1.977) -0.158 (0.176) 124 0.189 
 
alstria office REIT 
AG 
0.0925 (0.769) 6.124*** (0.913) 1.037 (0.807) -0.309 (0.782) -0.00254 (0.0697) 124 0.665 
 
Deutsche Euroshop 
AG 
-0.0398 (0.721) 3.684*** (0.855) 0.915 (0.757) 0.147 (0.733) 0.0314 (0.0653) 124 0.714 
 DIC Asset AG -0.263 (1.074) 8.150*** (1.275) 2.567** (1.127) -1.008 (1.093) -0.104 (0.0973) 124 0.583 
 Deutsche Wohnen SE -0.406 (0.962) 7.400*** (1.142) 5.217*** (1.010) -0.514 (0.979) 0.121 (0.0872) 124 0.619 
 Hamborner Reit AG 0.422 (1.008) 4.899*** (1.196) 1.853* (1.058) -0.215 (1.025) 0.0191 (0.0913) 124 0.462 
 LEG Immobilien AG -1.179 (1.017) 6.239*** (1.207) 2.868*** (1.067) -0.379 (1.034) 0.0720 (0.0921) 124 0.600 
 TAG Immobilien AG 0.181 (1.252) 5.862*** (1.485) 2.997** (1.313) -0.203 (1.273) 0.0441 (0.113) 124 0.515 
 TLG Immobilien AG -1.116 (1.038) 5.370*** (1.232) 0.164 (1.089) -0.313 (1.056) 0.113 (0.0940) 124 0.533 
 Vonovia SE -1.557* (0.909) 9.231*** (1.078) 7.396*** (0.954) -3.785*** (0.924) 0.103 (0.0823) 124 0.728 
Standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1             
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APPENDIX II 
Figure 1- Geographical allocation of direct real estate investment (Austria) 
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Figure 2 Geographical allocation of direct real estate investment (Belgium) 
  
  
 
3 
Figure 3 Geographical allocation of direct real estate investment (France) 
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Figure 4 Geographical allocation of direct real estate investment (Germany) 
  
  
 
5 
Figure 5 Geographical allocation of direct real estate investment (Italy) 
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Figure 6 Geographical allocation of direct real estate investment (Netherlands) 
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Figure 7 Geographical allocation of direct real estate investment (Norway) 
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Figure 8 Geographical allocation of direct real estate investment (Switzerland) 
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Figure 9 Geographical allocation of direct real estate investment (United Kingdom)
  
 
10 
Equation (4) Regression Output – Excluding UK-incorporated companies 
 
Variables CAR 
trd_int 14.95  
(12.95) 
log_GDP -4.837*  
(2.671) 
Constant 55.83*  
(27.92)   
Observations 33 
R-squared 0.104 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
